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THE NATION

APRIL 10, 1967 35 cents

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LETTERS

and gratefully received

Freeport, Me.

DEAR SIR: Of all the recent articles on the CIA . . . the best appeared in *The Nation*. I refer to Smith Simpson's "How Foggy Bottom Lost Its Spies," Jan. 9. Never have I encountered a clearer, more dispassionate account of the CIA, its origins, its growth and its menace to our society.

And congratulations also for John McDermott's "Vietnam Is No Mistake," Feb. 13. This goes perhaps a shade further in pinning the Vietnamese War on the present Administration than the facts warrant (as Professor Schuman pointed out in a recent letter), but it has certainly pulled enlightened thinking on the war in the right direction, namely: in pinning full responsibility for the continuation of the war on the Administration's determination, not its stupidity or helplessness.

In any case, McDermott's article is a milestone in anti-war thinking, although I still find it somewhat difficult to reconcile his latest conclusions with his previous position in "Welfare Imperialism in Vietnam" [*The Nation*, July 25, 1966]. His letter in your Mar. 6 issue did not, as far as I am concerned, reconcile the incompatibility—although both articles contained brilliant flashes of scholarship and insight, and I am extremely grateful to *The Nation* for publishing both of them.

David L. Graham

just so

Los Angeles, Calif.

DEAR SIR: Of the many theories advanced by scholars delving into the subject of crime, the one Michael Fooner has come up with ["The Case of the Culpable Victim," *The Nation*, Mar. 6]—that "carelessness in handling cash" (equated as a "natural habit") serves as encouragement and invitation to crime—strikes me as far-fetched bordering on nonsense. The inference is that if Mr. Citizen would make sure to lock his valuables and cash more securely it would somehow reduce the rate of crime. I wonder whether this alleged carelessness also applies to "unwise" investments or to legal fleecing of investors?

Irwin Shappin

no American presence

New York City

DEAR SIR: I have discussed the question of objectives at some length with officials of both the North Vietnamese government and the National Liberation Front in Western Europe, Cambodia and Hanoi. . . . I have spoken with Prof. Nguyen Van Hieu, a member of the Central Committee of the National Liberation Front, and with President Ho Chi Minh. On the basis of my own understanding of the position of the two parties . . . I should like to take issue with your Mar. 13 editorial, "War and Peace."

You state: "Apparently the Front would accede to an American presence in South Vietnam to prevent a renewal of hostilities." Such speculation cannot possibly stem from an informed source: it must be regarded as sheer fantasy. The NLF is broadly composed, exceedingly tolerant and impressively flexible; but it would never consider ratifying a foreign presence in South Vietnam. The Front contemplates participating in a postwar coalition government which would include elements which are today among its political opponents. But NLF spokesmen emphasize that this is an internal problem; it can only be settled after the United States has withdrawn its troops. . . . In the interests of a fair and just settlement, it is imperative that we be scrupulously accurate in representing the views of the North Vietnamese government and the National Liberation Front.

Russell Stetler, Executive Secretary
Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation

EDITORIALS

Resurrection '67

The Easter just past reminded Americans of the Resurrection, but in some of the cities there were lower-case resurrections of a character not easily defined. The Be-In in New York's Central Park, where 10,000 "hippies" crowded the Sheep Meadow, was the farthest out, with pink paint on foreheads, a great display of bananas (some Village pharmacologists have discovered that the skins are a legal and inexpensive substitute for "pot"), fantastic costumes, and chants of LOVE, LOVE, LOVE. Interviewed by bemused reporters, some complained that New Yorkers don't look at one another, and explained that the purpose of the Be-In was to dispel fear and glorify life. They were showing that they were not afraid of the stares of the conformists who came on the spectacle and were properly appalled.

Did the celebration in the Sheep Meadow have anything to do with religion? Hippies versed in theology could make out a case. The eminent theologian, Paul Tillich, defined religious belief as "ground of being." Presumably the celebrants were asserting both their state of being and the fact that they had something to be for, even though it seemed a little nebulous.

The Be-In is not peculiar to New York. It is said to have originated in San Francisco, where thousands of hippies paid homage to life and love last January.

In a New York church the minister, dressed in a green sports coat, delivered an Easter sermon consisting mainly of readings from the works of Dylan Thomas and Bob Dylan. Three dancers then skipped up the aisle to what used to be the altar, where they jumped about while the congregation sang, "Give me your hand, give me your hand. All I want is to love our God, oh." The worshipers then pinned small squares of felt onto a yellow banner hanging opposite the pulpit. "We're creating—weaving in a sense—our own Easter banner," the clergyman explained. It was *aggiornamento* in Washington Square.

In front of St. Patrick's Cathedral pickets demonstrated for peace in Vietnam. They were surrounded by policemen with bull horns and walkie-talkies, but the crowds were more friendly than in the past. Either it was the spirit of Easter, or the Vietnamese War has become so unpopular that protests are viewed sympathetically. A veteran picket in a coolie hat inclined to the latter view. "People don't make nasty remarks any more," he said. "They're beginning to understand."

Rebellion on the day of the Resurrection was not confined to the hippies and their subculture. An Air Force Academy instructor, Capt. Dale E. Noyd, filed suit in federal court in Denver, through the Civil Liberties Union, to enjoin the Air Force from sending him to Vietnam. "I must stand on what I am and what I believe."

Captain Noyd told his superiors. "The war in Vietnam is unjust and immoral, and if ordered to do so, I shall refuse to fight in that war." In England, when serving with an F-100 squadron, he received a medal for landing a badly damaged plane. He is a career officer—what could be more square? But you never can tell.

The Ultimate Escalation

The quarterly *New University Thought* has published a special issue, "Decisions for America," incorporating the papers delivered at the conference on "The National Priorities Problem" organized by Prof. Seymour Melman and some of his colleagues at Columbia University. *Nation* readers are familiar with Mr. Melman's thesis, expressed in *Our Depleted Society* and in numerous articles and speeches. What is not yet generally realized, however, is that the problem is not only one of guns versus butter, or Vietnam versus the Great Society, or whether electronics engineers, for instance, should be working on devices for continuous monitoring of critically sick hospital patients or on anti-missile-missile radar guidance. The real question is how much longer there are going to be people. The way things are going, thermonuclear war may erupt, not in a comfortably distant future but in the final stages of the Vietnamese War, now entering its most crucial phase since Lyndon B. Johnson double-crossed the electorate in 1964.

On a longer time scale, the outlook is examined in the paper on "Humanizing Modern Technology," by Stephen Unger, like Mr. Melman a professor of engineering at Columbia. Mr. Unger has brought together the certain effects on human beings of the use of thermonuclear weapons, the futility of all proposed means of protection, and the flaws in the argument that mutual deterrence will avert a showdown. Much of this we have heard before (which is added reason for taking it seriously), but Mr. Unger also offers a new and pertinent analysis of the possible transition from conventional to nuclear warfare. As casualties mount on both sides, national "honor" becomes a paramount issue. When the foe still refuses to submit to our "honorable" terms, and all conventional escalations have been exhausted, and both the military and civilian populations are becoming dangerously restive, a quick finish may be sought by application of "small" tactical nuclear weapons. Thus—assuming that both sides have such weapons at their disposal—the escalation process will once more be set in motion, at a higher level. The bigger the war, the greater the accumulation of casualties, the more difficult it will be for the weaker side to give in and the stronger side to stop escalating. Or, if the two sides are equally matched, Mr. Unger suggests that there will always be highly placed people in both countries who will advocate "getting it over with," and eventually the "grand annihilation" will be brought about.

Mr. Unger does not apply this prognosis to Vietnam,

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but one can readily conceive of circumstances in which the war will take some such course. A land invasion of North Vietnam appears to be in the works: the advent of Gen. Creighton D. Abrams, a proven ground-gainer of World War II, is the most recent augury. As long as only General Giap's divisions oppose the American advance, TNT, gunpowder and napalm may suffice, but suppose, when we are on the brink of "victory," the Chinese hordes should be thrown into the fray, as in Korea when MacArthur came to the Yalu River. Will America, still short of 200 million population, be expected to stand up against the manpower of 700 million Chinese? Secretary McNamara has been quoted as saying that the United States will use nuclear weapons "in any situation in the world when we believe it is desirable to use them in our own interest." If not then, when?

New University Thought appeals for conferences to be held on every campus, with the papers in its special issue as a springboard. This is a fine idea, but it would be well for the participants to be awakened to a new sense of urgency. It is perfectly possible that events will overtake the question of whether technology can be humanized.

Evasion by Definition

With his customary insensitivity to principle, President Johnson has implemented a piously expedient report on CIA support of private institutions prepared for him by Under Secretary of State Katzenbach. To reassure our friends abroad, the report states, the CIA is enjoined in future from this type of subversion—except when in the judgment of the Secretaries of State and Defense the practice is necessary to the national welfare. The men so designated are Messrs. Rusk and McNamara, and our allies will have to decide, in the light of policies this pair has previously endorsed in the name of security, how much assurance they have in fact been given.

The recommendation bans without qualification CIA influence upon the overseas activities of "educational or private voluntary organizations," but one requires no unusual capacity for reading between lines to see that this careful wording need not be held to include labor unions, corporations with international interests or professional societies. Indeed, given the Administration's proved talent for evasion by definition, it is doubtful that it would cover any group that Mr. Rusk and Mr. McNamara wished to buy with covert funds.

The Katzenbach report does not put an end forthwith to the practice it pretends to deplore, but urges a phasing out as rapidly as "clean" money can be found for the ongoing activities. The Under Secretary does not tell us what groups are still being so benefited; instead, according to *The New York Times*, he describes their number as "very, very, very small." The paper wisely ascribes no figure to this adverbial triplication. In brief, the new policy states that the Administration, acknowledg-

ing the error of having been found out, will continue to subvert American citizens for as long and under such circumstances as it sees fit.

The report justifies the practice of turning private groups into secret government agencies on the ground that Communist countries exercise such control. This excuse is consistent with the general blunting of our democratic principles. We are prepared to fight anywhere, any time, in defense of the "open society," and we employ the techniques of totalitarianism whenever we think we detect a temporary advantage in doing so. Indeed, it might be held that today a country like Russia is the more "open." One assumes that its citizens are the servants of national policy; by our traditions, that is not liberty, but neither is it duplicity. Mr. Johnson's ringing slogan, The Great Society, begins to sound like one of the more cynical utterances of the Bourbon monarchs.

Senator Brooke and Dr. King

Anyone reading the headlines of March 24 might conclude that history was a plot. One read, "Dr. King to Press Antiwar Stand"; another, "Brooke Shifts War View and Supports President." No doubt the timing was accidental, but accidents can be politically important. In this instance, what would have been a setback for the President turned into a day of triumph. He had, as the papers put it, won a prize convert whose timely conversion offset Dr. King's renewed attack on the Administration's war policy, which he first launched at the Nation Institute conference in Los Angeles on February 25.

Aside from the fact that a switch in position is inherently newsworthy—even when, as in this instance, it is carefully qualified—Senator Brooke's maiden speech was bound to attract public attention. He is important in his own right, by virtue of past achievements; he is also the first Negro to sit in the Senate since Reconstruction. Even if he had reiterated his earlier view that we should cease bombing North Vietnam without demanding a *quid pro quo*, he would have got the headlines. But his general conclusion that the "direction of our present military efforts is necessary," gave the hawks a field day and made the President a happy man. While Senator Brooke did have some sensible things to say about American policy in Southeast Asia—points which the press did not emphasize—the general effect of the speech was to strengthen the hawk position. Not only did the speech take the edge off Dr. King's important and cogently reasoned statement but it will, to some extent, further divide the already divided Negro civil rights movement on the crucial war question. More important, Senator Brooke's endorsement of present military policies can work mischief in the Republican ranks. The front-runner, George Romney, has been trying to avoid making the general endorsement of the Administration's conduct of the war which Senator Brooke has now made. With Governor Rockefeller, who

supports the President without reservation, already urging Romney to take a hawk position, this added pressure from still another "liberal-moderate" Republican will offset the kind of counterpressure that Senator Javits has been attempting to exert on the unhappy and hesitant Romney. During the '66 campaign, Mark Hatfield, Charles Percy and Senator Brooke were in fairly close agreement and were stressing, in varying degrees, a critical line. The election victories of these three held some promise of moving the GOP into a position less belligerent than that adopted by the Administration, but this promise is fading. For months the columnists and commentators have been saying that Vietnam will be the dominant issue in the 1968 election, if the war is still on. But given a few more defections such as Senator Brooke's, the issue may degenerate into a competition in hawkishness.

More surprising than the fact that the Senator decided to shift his position on the war is his failure to counter the thrust of Dr. King's criticism. On the C.B.S. program, *Face the Nation*, Martin Agronsky, Alex Kendrick and Robert Novak, in some of the best questioning of an interviewee in years, forced Senator Brooke to acknowledge that the war in Vietnam had brought the civil rights movement to a dead halt. The Senator, of course, said that "survival" came first—and, besides, there are only so many dollars to disburse. The argument is evasive on its face. With a proper allocation of resources—with tough wage and price controls—it would not be necessary to cut back Great Society programs. But to hold conservative support, the Administration has elected to jettison social reform while steadily increasing military spending. In endorsing the President's direction of the war, Senator Brooke has not merely let the peace movement down, he has left American Negroes in the lurch.

Kill Cong

Hollywood, usually quick to produce films showing American wars to be holy wars, appears to have lost interest in Vietnam after the tentative *The Green Berets*. Is this because the Hollywood formula of the good-guy, underdog Americans against the wickedly aggressive Nazis does not fit? In any reasonable facsimile of this war it would be difficult to portray as saviors the heavily equipped Americans who have come 8,000 miles to assault lightly armed, underfed, pajama-clad natives in their straw villages.

In earlier wars it was the Germans, Japanese or Chinese who were held responsible for the deaths of women and children in flaming villages; in this war, if our own dispatches and newsreels are to be believed, the Americans are playing this role. In earlier wars the local populace was subjugated by a puppet government set up by Germans or Japanese, and the Americans appeared as the liberators. In South Vietnam the puppet government is established by the Americans, whose forces range the

countryside like so many Germans or Japanese. The underground is opposed to the Americans, not on their side as in Italy and France.

Ingenious though they are, the script writers are evidently baffled by the intractability of the material. They are joined in this by the writers of comic books who, according to National Periodical Publications, Inc., have not found a formula for Vietnam that the kiddies will buy. In the picture books, the GIs are still back on the beaches of Normandy and Okinawa and in the hills of Korea.

Spilled Milk

It is distressing to see milk being spilled—and the dairy farmers are spilling millions of dollars' worth. But it is not they who are to blame. They are caught in a squeeze that goes back many years and their patience is at an end. In a familiar agricultural situation, the cost of what they buy keeps going up and the price of their product remains the same. What can they do but dump the milk? Under the circumstances, it is the best tactic available to them. It is spectacular—the TV stations show it every night—and nonviolent. There has been little disorder, largely because dumping is the preferred technique.

But the odds are against the embattled dairymen. As always, the farmer is the farmer's worst enemy. Raised in the tradition of rugged individualism, farmers tend to go their own way. Those who are making a profit sell their milk, while those who are in financial straits—and can least afford it—are dumping theirs. Some big farms are active in the dumping program, but it is doubtful that enough milk will be wasted to bring the distributors to terms. There has been some support from organized labor but, again, hardly enough to affect the outcome.

Collective bargaining should be encouraged by every possible means among the farmers themselves. Until they are well enough organized to protect their own interest, in a society like ours they will always be in trouble and sporadic revolts will not get them out of it. The only redeeming feature of the present situation is that, while the Vietnamese War is not the only factor in the farmers' difficulties, the milk-wasting program does give some evidence that the war is beginning to trigger significant economic discontent on the home front. In the long-term outlook, another favorable factor is stressed by the *News Letter of Business and Industry* (October 24, 1966) of the New Jersey Bank. Discussing "Our Dwindling Farm Surpluses," the *News Letter* says that "U.S. policy must shift from its long fight against food surpluses to a fight against world famine." And: "The priority given scientists and engineers in our military and space programs is having adverse effects on the supply of agricultural scientists and farm engineers turned out by the universities." When these facts sink in, the farmers, adequately organized, may be able to improve their lot.

Forgotten History of the Draft

DORIAN J. FLIEGEL

Mr. Fliegel is studying in the field of contemporary American social problems at Amherst College.

Whatever popular opinion as to draft reform may be, the fundamental issues have been decided: there is going to be a lottery, 19 year olds will be eligible first, and there will be no nonmedical graduate deferments. Congress need only ritually extend the Selective Service Act another four years and Johnson's proposals will be law by Executive order.

The new draft machinery may indeed be more equitable, but the surprising fact that emerges from a consideration of the President's specific proposals is that the primary consideration was not fairness, but the course of American foreign policy, and the means by which that policy might best be advanced. We are witnessing the transformation of the draft from a temporary to a permanent system of military procurement; from an expedient devised to meet the threat of a national emergency requiring a conventional mass army, to a streamlined system intended to meet the long-range needs of a continuing policy of intervention and occupation within the context of limited warfare.

In the name of democratizing the draft, Americans are militarizing their society and foreign policy. All aspects of the draft reform movement—its initial motivation, the rhetoric in which it is couched, the basic structural consequences—reflect the degree to which our society is increasingly subject to military pressures and priorities.

The principal factor in the draft debate is not the Selective Service System itself. Dissension over the Vietnamese War and the fact that hundreds of thousands of draftees are being sent to Vietnam have initiated the controversy over the fairness and wisdom of the draft. The most common early criticism of the draft concerned inequities resulting from the difference in local board procedures and the general disruption and uncertainty injected into the lives of young men. But with the escalation of the war in 1965, criticism both escalated and shifted. Suddenly the one glaring injustice became the 1.7 million college and graduate students who possess the II-S deferment, some until the age of 26 when they become virtually exempt. In point of fact, students who parlay deferments into exemptions are only a fraction of the more than 50 per cent of the manpower pool who never render military service, including more than 3.5 million men exempt as fathers or with other dependents, and more than 5 million exempt for failing to meet mental and physical standards. Nevertheless, the students, partly because they dramatize the difference in fortune between a minority who face death abroad and a majority who can pursue their private lives at home, and partly because of their prominence in dissenting from the government's policies in Vietnam, became the single major popular target of draft reform. Mr. Johnson's proposals reflect the popu-

lar attitude, and no matter what their final form, no student hereafter will be able to escape exposure to army call-up.

Yet, oddly enough, just before 1965 we appeared to be heading toward a conviction that the draft was obsolete. Prior to the Vietnamese build-up, official studies pointed to the waste involved in the draft system and to the advisability of attracting the necessary manpower on a voluntary basis by offering sufficient inducements. As recently as 1964, a minority report to the House on the military manpower procurement system indicated that voluntary enlistment was feasible and recommended that the approach should be studied in detail.

As a result of pressure arising from the report, President Johnson, in April, 1964, ordered a Defense Department study of the draft law and military manpower program which was to include the "possibility of meeting our requirements on a voluntary basis for the next decade." During the elections of that year, when Johnson ran as the peace candidate, there were clear indications that he was seriously considering abolition of the draft. The study was completed on schedule and did, it appears, foresee an end to compulsory service, but it came at the wrong time. The President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were by then planning the massive Vietnamese offensive, and rumors of a volunteer system would have utterly confused the country and raised intolerable questions as to our plans. Consequently, the study was not released until June, 1966, and was thoroughly altered to exclude any possibility that conscription might be scrapped. As finally presented to the House Armed Services Committee at that time by Assistant Secretary of Defense Thomas D. Morris, it concluded that the extremely high cost of a professional army, estimated at anywhere from \$4 billion to \$17 billion annually, was prohibitive.

Congressmen severely attacked the Defense Department for intentionally delaying the study, and for conducting private hearings with no published testimony. It was said that the figures were so imprecise as to settle nothing. Critics pointed out that only inadequate attempts had been made to determine the savings which would result from the reduced turnover and training cycles, elimination of Selective Service bureaucracy, and greater overall effectiveness.

In the midst of this furor President Johnson announced in July that he was appointing a National Advisory Commission on Selective Service to report on all aspects of the draft and to make recommendations for its improvement. Concerning the narrow range of official alternatives, Hanson Baldwin, a man usually tolerant of military priorities, wrote in *The New York Times Magazine* of November 20:

Much more spadework needs to be done before either the Presidential commission or Congress can reasonably recommend new legislation. The Pentagon's failure, for instance, to give an adequate account-

ing of the savings and costs of a long-term professional volunteer force needs rectification.

From the start, however, it was clear that the abolition of the draft was not to get serious consideration by the commission. The Defense Department alteration of its study successfully torpedoed the immediate prospects of abolishing conscription and may even have permanently killed the possibility of a voluntary army.

One of the remarkable and important aspects of the discussion surrounding draft reform is that it reveals over the last fifteen years, and especially since the Vietnamese War, a complete reversal of popular attitude toward conscription and the original intentions of the law.

The present draft law, officially known as the Universal Military Training and Service Act, is essentially the act signed by President Truman in 1951. That law was the result of the last great national debate on the subject, which also took place in the midst of a war. Two facts about the original intention of the law are crucial: first, it is selective because it was meant to be temporary; second, it is temporary because it was specifically meant to serve as a counterbalance to the growing power of the American military establishment.

In the context of the Korean crisis and with the draft law of 1948 about to expire, the Pentagon had been routinely given the task of writing renewal legislation. But when the proposed bill emerged, it was found that the Pentagon had included a provision for Universal Military Training (UMT), a program which would compel all males to undergo six months of training and eight years in the reserves, and which was to replace Selective Service as a permanent peacetime policy. Public opinion was outraged and a large civilian coalition came into existence to oppose a universal and permanent draft, which a broad segment of the country considered to be a militarization of the society beyond demonstrable military need. Critics of UMT charged that the military was exploiting the hysteria of the Korean crisis.

The military argument was weak because the generals could not show convincingly that there was a strategic necessity for the program. It was not required for the Korean effort, and proponents of UMT had increasingly to invoke amorphous moral and social benefits which they alleged would accrue to the general society from the equity of universal military training. In the end, UMT was separated from Selective Service and soundly defeated. This rejection and the adoption of a temporary and selective draft were meant to check the growth of military power and to dispose of the notion that conscription should serve anything other than a strictly military purpose. In 1951-52, inequity was accepted as an unavoidable part of such a system and as a secondary issue. The real question was whether measures would be taken to make the draft more permanent or to insure that it remained temporary. On this ground, the deferments built into Selective Service were justified as a guarantee of liberty.

The irony of the present movement to do away with student deferments is that no military justification whatsoever has been put forward. Last summer before

the House Armed Services Committee, Secretary Morris defended student deferment on the ground that the military relies on the civilian educational system for 90 per cent of its new officers. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, director of Selective Service, supported the policy by reminding the committee that 56 per cent of college students serve, as opposed to 46 per cent of noncollege youths, that the policy is invaluable in channeling students into training for positions which are essential to the national economy and defense, and that even with the Vietnamese build-up the I-A pool would not have to be expanded by the reclassification of college students.

Thus, from a military point of view, it is not necessary to abolish student deferments. Yet, unable to do away with the draft in the context of Vietnam, and impatient to deal with what appear to be glaring inequities,



proponents of draft reform have turned toward greater universalization of service as the solution.

Not that true equality is attainable by the method proposed. A national lottery will guarantee that no one will escape exposure to the draft by turning a deferment into an exemption, but it will not remove the basic inequity between the minority who will be condemned to two years of service by lot, and the lucky majority who will be effectively exempt. The army, by exempting more than 5 million men as unfit for service, has worked more inequities than Selective Service deferments. The poor, who are disproportionately unable to meet these standards, will now become the outstanding exempt group. This fact especially reveals the superficiality of the draft reform and the hypocrisy of a society which meets the problems of structural inequality by exposing the educated and better off to the draft to fight a war which is waged at the direct expense of the poverty program, and the burden of which is borne by the poor through inflation and an inequitable tax structure.

But since universalization appears to make the draft more just, it will no doubt make it more acceptable on

a permanent basis. Fifteen years ago the primary concern was the justice of the system; today the primary concern is justice *within* the system.

The more society becomes committed to the maintenance of the military, the more the issues which relate to the military, especially in the realm of foreign affairs, will be removed from political debate. The more we accept and rely upon a large and expensive military establishment, the more will military needs take priority over domestic social problems. Furthermore, with a military establishment whose actions are legitimized in advance by the legitimization of the system, democratic public debate will inevitably be constricted.

But the full importance of the changes in social attitude implied by greater legitimization of conscription becomes apparent only by considering the structural changes taking place in the draft system and how they relate to our foreign policy.

The trouble with the present draft system is that it was developed in the post World War II world on the assumption that we faced a national emergency which would require the mass mobilization of manpower. Thus, in 1951, the purpose of the Selective Service by law was to select as expediently as possible men who were essential for military service. But the military, on the other hand, recognized that it would have to take as many men as possible to justify the need for the draft, and that therefore it would have to distribute the burden of service as widely as possible.

Working against the intentions of both groups over the last fifteen years has been the growth of the manpower pool. The result has been that an increasingly smaller percentage of the available manpower has been needed for military service. Prior to 1965, the military requirement was only 400,000 men per year of the 12 million who were eligible. As a result, the Selective Service has granted increasingly liberal deferments and the military has raised standards to curtail eligibility. Congressmen have charged that the military has also padded its roster to create unnecessary positions and refused to accept voluntary enlistments beyond the point where they would threaten the need for a draft law.

That President Johnson's proposals are aimed primarily at streamlining the draft rather than at wiping out inequities is indicated by the equally important proposals he has made for turning 70,000 military positions over to civilians in fiscal 1967, for tightening up the standards for mental and physical exemption, and for converting the more than 4,000 local boards into from 300 to 500 area centers.

A policy of limited war demands that the society remain largely unruffled and give bipartisan support to the adventure. War may always be an extension of politics, but limited warfare is most transparently an extension of the political arm. The Administration must be in full control and be assured that its policy is fully sanctioned. To be effective, limited war must be fast and efficient and thus not dependent upon the checks of democratic political debate.

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and policy

makers like Bundy and Rostow have already predicted a "thirty-year series of little wars." Prof. Seymour Melman reported recently that McNamara has already named ten world trouble spots where we can expect the need for military intervention in the near future. The Defense Department has proposed the building of eighteen to twenty giant FDL (Fast Deployment Logistics) ships at a cost of \$1 billion. These vessels would be continually maintained at sea and would be fully loaded with heavy equipment and supplies to maintain troops who would presumably go into action by air.

In such perspective, the Vietnamese War is no accident, but part of a new long-range policy of intervention aimed at fighting limited wars to secure political ends. If the draft seems a bungling mess, that is primarily because it is out of gear with the nature of the policy.

McNamara has said privately, according to an article in *The Atlantic* in March:

The greatest contribution Vietnam is making—right or wrong beside the point—is that it is developing an ability in the United States to fight a limited war, to go to war without the necessity of arousing the public ire. In that sense, Vietnam is almost a necessity in our history, because that is the kind of war we'll most likely be facing for the next fifty years.

It seems clear, then, that the proposal of the lottery and the abolition of deferments is a move toward creating a procurement system which meets the needs of a policy based upon intervention and occupation. Such a program would ideally be fast, responsive, flexible, and cause the minimum amount of disturbance to the civilian economy and society. It would demand that the policy be in effect presanctioned, with financial and manpower support committed in advance. Hence the importance of a system which is socially legitimate because it is as fair as luck itself.

Constitutionally, civilians have checks upon the military through the power of Congress to appropriate funds, to declare war, and to raise an army; and by the fact that the President as Commander in Chief is a civilian. But these checks have grown increasingly meaningless as the military has become a direct offshoot of administrative policy.

The one major alternative which could have recaptured democratic control of the new politico-military policy would have been the establishment of a professional army. A highly trained and technically skilled professional army restricted in size and budget would place obvious limitations on the ability of the Executive and the military to involve this country in wars of intervention and occupation without Congressional and popular approval.

By contrast, the lottery enlarges, perhaps by as much as 50 per cent, the immediately available manpower pool and facilitates immediate call-ups by eliminating the check of deferments. It eliminates even the checks which the present system places on how quickly and to how large an extent the Administration can involve us in a war without first securing widespread popular support. The new system will be as flexible as an accordion, and the politico-military policy makers, not the people, will play the tune.

IS THERE A LATIN AMERICA?

RONALD HILTON

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On April 12, President Johnson will represent the Colossus of the North at a meeting in Punta del Este which will celebrate the birth of the Colossus of the South. At least, we are told that a colossus is being born: a unified Latin America. The curtain raiser for the Punta del Este summit has just concluded at Montevideo, where twenty nations endorsed in principle the creation of a common market by unified efforts to be made between 1970 and 1985.

Sen. Wayne Morse, who does not very often display enthusiasm for President Johnson's activities, has described the meeting as "the most important conference we have yet had on Latin America." The precise aim of the conference, as the United States sees it, is to organize a common market—i.e., a common tariff barrier for all member nations—in 1970. It is hoped that within a decade this common market will be fully organized. The Latin American advocates of integration hope in addition for a much broader union which will end the unpleasant dictum about "the Disunited States of Latin America."

The aspiration of some Latin American intellectuals is not surprising. The vision of a united Latin America which could speak to the United States on a basis of equality is an old one. The surprise is the reversal in attitude of the United States, which hitherto has backed a Pan American system in which it was the kingpin. It has in the past proposed, unsuccessfully, a Pan American common market. Latin America has rejected this plan, which would open up the southern republics to U.S. enterprise and kill many of the fledgling industries there. Two questions must now be asked: Why has the United States changed its tune? How far can Latin America unite?

Regarding the first, one cannot help suspecting that in some measure our endorsement of Latin American unity is a gimmick. Anyone familiar with Washington knows the propensities of administrations to think up grandiose schemes and phrases which give the impression of a great leap forward. Undoubtedly, there is an element of this, and Johnson's trip is in considerable measure a public relations gesture. (Ten days before the Punta del Este meeting, the President entertained a large Latin American diplomatic party at his Texas ranch, supplying a barbecue dinner and ten-gallon hats to the visiting envoys.) Yet there is substance in the U.S. support of a Latin American common market. Essentially, the United States has given up hope of creating a Pan American common market. Moreover, taking into account the disparity of wages and other facts of life, our business elite has discovered that it can make money from foreign subsidiaries, provided they command a large enough market. Few individual republics offer a market of the required size, but a unified Latin America would do so.

In addition, a Latin American common market would spare Washington a recurring embarrassment. When a republic like Honduras demands that the United States facilitate its anti-economical acquisition of a steel mill or a jet airline simply for national prestige, Washington could refer to the master planning of the common market.

How far can Latin America unite? This highly technical question is scarcely broached in the enthusiastic statements supporting President Johnson's mission. There is a general feeling that the small nation state is an anachronism in the modern world and that larger groupings should be encouraged. Sometimes large groupings succeed; the European Common Market is the most conspicuous case. More frequently they fail. The Federation of the West Indies failed pathetically, and we are now left with an assortment of mini-states which no one knows what to do with. Will a unified Latin America succeed like the European Common Market, or will it fail like the Caribbean federation? A major international conference to be held in Palo Alto in April, 1968, under the auspices of the California Institute of International Studies, will attempt to provide a detailed answer. Meanwhile, I offer on the eve of the conference my own tentative assessment.

There is unmistakably a move away from Pan Americanism. Disillusioned with it, the governments of Latin America are groping toward unity. They sense that Latin America has a low priority in the concerns of the Johnson Administration and believe that by forming a unified front they would have a louder voice not only in their dealings with Washington and the other capitals of the world but also with international organizations such as the European Common Market. There are many signs of this trend. In December, 1964, a Latin American parliament was established at a conference held in Lima, Peru. More recently, the emphasis has been economic. President Eduardo Frei of Chile and, following his lead, many other Latin American Presidents have stressed the need for Latin American unity.

No Longer a Back Yard

After World War II the United States created around the world a series of alliances, systems or spheres of influence in which it would be the dominating force. These systems are breaking down because one or more of the other powers involved does not wish to be a junior partner. It is easy to denounce this dissolution as Communist-inspired, but in fact the regimes which are defying the United States are rightist, centrist or leftist, and they often proclaim their friendship for the United States while they undermine the U.S.-controlled systems. De Gaulle immediately comes to mind. The government of Pakistan is conservative, but by befriending Communist China it is diminishing U.S. influence in Southeast Asia and weakening the American-blessed SEATO and CENTO pacts. The Philippine Islands has a moderate government, but it is loosening its bonds to the United States: asserting its

personality by abandoning July 4 as its Independence Day, dropping the American names of streets, and even stressing its Hispanic as well as native tradition.

We smugly regard Latin America as our back yard, but the same phenomenon is occurring there. We assumed that the Pact of Bogotá, which transformed the Pan American Union into the Organization of American States, would rejuvenate the inter-American system, but the OAS has failed to spark the enthusiasm of Latin Americans. It would be foolish to see in this the hand of Castro's Cuba, however much Castro may despise the OAS. The fact is that Latin America is asserting its identity and in the process trying to find unity. Indeed, Castro's revolution was primarily a revolt against a corrupt regime closely associated with the United States. Castro was seeking the mystical ideal of *cubanidad*, and only well after the revolution had triumphed did he ally himself with the Communists. The Cuban Government today is still primarily nationalist; at heart, it wants to be assimilated into the Sino-Soviet systems no more than it wished to be integrated into the U.S. bloc. The assertion of Latin America's identity is an old story, and it is only by distorting history that we can make Bolívar or Martí out to be heralds of the Pan American system.

In appearance, all of Latin America is being Americanized. It might be assumed that this will make Latin Americans understand and like the United States. The more prosperity and the more gadgets, the more love of the United States from which these blessings flow. Unfortunately, this is a *non sequitur*, as is proved by the example of Cuba, which was the most Americanized, gadgetized and televised country in Latin America. Guatemala, for example, spends freely on automobiles, TV sets and transistor radios. But the apparent prosperity is enjoyed by only 27 per cent of the population, who receive 78 per cent of the GNP, while the remaining 73 per cent of the population receive a bare 22 per cent. Even the peasant who has managed to buy a transistor radio on credit will be envious of the "oligarch" who has an automobile and a TV set. The intellectuals and the students, who usually have neither of the latter, will see in this hateful disparity the familiar result of alliance between the United States, big business and a military dictatorship.

To what degree is Latin America within the financial orbit of the United States? The rate of U.S. investment in Latin America varies considerably according to the business climate. In Cuba it is zero. In Brazil, which is now the *enfant gâté* of the United States, vigorous attempts are being made to attract U.S. capital. Yet it does not follow that growth of U.S. investments will bring about a sense of solidarity with the United States. It has not in Cuba, France or even Canada. The U.S. Government has developed mixed feelings about increasing U.S. investments in other parts of the world, but it is actively encouraging investment in Latin America as a means of insuring that the area remains in the U.S. orbit, and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was intended primarily to encourage investment in the southern republics.

The prosperity of the urban elite brought about by American-style capitalism is not viewed as a panacea in Latin America except by the minority which profits from it. Although we hear about advanced social security in

Latin America, in no country is there adequate unemployment compensation, and yet unemployment and underemployment are the continent's most serious problem. In Mexico they probably run as high as 30 per cent (the official figures disguise this fact), but the Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social, which provides cradle-to-grave medical care for those it covers, does nothing for the unemployed. Officials of the institute admit that the problem is too big for the government. It is hard to sell Latin Americans an economic system which seems to have a built-in high unemployment rate.

The People and the Bankers

Linked with unemployment is grinding poverty, which an apparent trade boom may help to hide. We are told that the Mexican economy is prospering, and the boast is made that Mexico has now become an exporter of — *mirabile dictu!* — wheat, to the tune of about 3 million bushels a year. The cruel fact is that wheat is exported because the mass of Mexicans are too poor to buy all the wheat products they want. Let us not forget the resentment aroused in Mexico by the export to the United States of cattle — and men — for whom there was no place in the Mexican economy.

The Latin American press pays scant attention to the fate of the peasants. The Mexico City papers report little of the deep unrest in the Mexican countryside, although President Díaz Ordaz felt compelled to refer to it in his inaugural address. The local power elite usually resents land reform, but the U.S. Administration has made its concern clear. The example of Cuba has aroused deep anxiety in the U.S. Government. Well it may, for in addition to the threat of Castroism, the new Institute of Latin American Studies in the Academy of Sciences in Moscow is showing a special interest in Latin American peasant movements. Only Heaven and perhaps the CIA know what the Chinese Communists are up to. The pre-occupation of the United States is reflected in the Dominican Republic, where there is popular sympathy in the countryside for the regime of nearby Cuba. The Ford Foundation and the U.S. Agency for International Development have assisted a group of Santiago de los Caballeros businessmen to found an agricultural school, and are in general trying to relieve the strains among the peasantry. This is but one example of the peaceful transformation with which the United States hopes to avoid a violent change in the social structure of Latin America.

The Alliance for Progress was launched amid great hopes at the 1961 conference at Punta del Este. Since then, widespread disillusionment has set in. Colombia, which was to be the showcase of the Alliance, presents one of the most discouraging spectacles in Latin America. Although we are assured that the corner has been turned, in general the Alliance has apparently failed to stimulate the 2.5 per cent annual economic growth which was its minimum goal. Too many people thought the Alliance would help them promote their own peculiar projects.

In the struggle between the structuralists, who want rapid social reform in Latin America regardless of its effect on financial stability, and the monetarists, who think that only a stable currency and fiscal responsibility

will make substantial, albeit slow, progress possible, Latin America tends to side with the structuralists, the United States and the various international banks with the monetarists. Despite its alluring name, the Alliance for Progress represents a victory for the monetarists, while the Brazilian-sponsored Operação Panamericana, which the U.S.-sponsored Alliance displaced, would have been carried out in the spirit of the structuralists. At the insistence of the United States, the Alliance for Progress is being used as an instrument to impose fiscal reform. This may appear admirable, but Latin Americans do not like to be told that they must tighten their belts, and it seems cruel for well-fed Americans to exhort impoverished Latin Americans to do so. It is startling, for example, to read in an advertisement published in the United States this proud boast by the Venezuelan Government about its accomplishments under the Alliance for Progress: "In the field of fiscal reform, Venezuela started taking necessary measures early in 1961. Salaries of public employees were reduced." Featherbedding is one thing, but the lowering of moderate government salaries seems a strange form of progress. Some confidence in the Alliance for Progress developed as a result of the creation in 1964 of the Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress, but in general, enthusiasm for the Alliance has waned markedly.

Financial activities in Latin America of U.S. investors and U.S.-sponsored banks give a false impression of hemispheric unity. Even Latin American businessmen dislike playing second fiddle to U.S. capitalism, although they will accept foreign capital as a catalyst for their own activities. The Communists wish to assert the personality of Latin America by fighting U.S. capitalism, the en-

trepreneurs by slowly usurping it or reducing it to a minority role.

Most Latin Americans are embarrassed by inter-American military cooperation. There was something noble about it during the crusade against Nazism, but now it is primarily concerned with counterinsurgency and aimed at bolstering the *status quo*. The U.S. armed forces are seen as potentially playing the invidious role they have assumed in South Vietnam. Operation Ayacucho, the combined military maneuvers held each December in Peru, provides a grotesque contrast between the wastefulness of the armies and the crushing poverty of the Indians of the Andes. It is hard to wax Homeric about Arms and the Businessman. In sum, Latin Americans do not feel solidarity with the United States. Is the alternative a united Latin America?

Cultural Unity of Latin America

First of all, does "Latin America" exist? There are doubts, and even the name has been widely questioned. Is there a psychological basis without which unification of Latin America will be an illusion? Does Latin America have cultural unity? After all, "Africa," divided as it is into three ethnic worlds, is little more than a geographical expression, and for this reason the Organization for African Unity is a paper elephant.

Many conservative Latin Americans have proclaimed that the southern republics are united in race, language and religion. Racially, Latin America has more variety than any other area in the world except Africa—from the white population of Argentina and Uruguay to the Negro population of Haiti and the heavily Indian population of Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia. However, there is not the sharp split between two racial groups which characterizes the United States, and the process of *mestizaje* is slowly bringing about what José Vasconcelos called "the cosmic race," the first synthesis of the white, yellow and Negro races in the world. Argentines seldom boast any longer of their racial purity, while the romantic cult of the pure Indian seems to have been dismissed as unrealistic.

Although mulattos and Negroes still occupy the lowest stratum in Latin American society, they are no longer viewed with the scorn implicit in earlier Argentinian references to "the monkeys of Brazil." Gilberto Freyre's thesis of "Luso-Tropicalism" dovetails with Vasconcelos' proclamation of "the cosmic race," since it maintains that the Portuguese in Brazil showed an unusual ability to mingle with the Negroes and the Indians and to interbreed with them. A few years ago Salvador de Madariaga's thesis that Bolívar was part Negro aroused violent resentment in Spanish America. I recently put this suggestion to a group of young Colombian conservatives. They showed no sign of irritation, calmly admitting that it was possible. In short, Latin America is moving toward racial unity.

Does Latin America have linguistic unity? Anthropologists exaggerate the role of Indian languages. In an attempt to reach the Indian population, Cornell University and the University of California at Berkeley have been encouraged to develop the study of such languages as Quechua and Guaraní. In southern Mexico and Central



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America a surprising number of Indian dialects survive, and the Summer Institute of Linguistics has been studying them assiduously for missionary purposes. How fast these dialects will disappear is not certain, but there is no doubt that the number of monolingual Indians is declining rapidly. Mass communications are spreading a knowledge of Spanish and Portuguese, and the futile attempts to revive Nahuatl in Mexico have the support neither of the Right nor the Left. Admittedly, the differences between Spanish and Portuguese are such that the ordinary Spanish American does not understand Portuguese, although the reverse is not true. This division is sufficient to contribute to the lack of empathy between Brazil and Spanish America. French, English and Dutch are spoken in Middle America by relatively small numbers of people. Despite these qualifications, it may be said that in comparison with other continents Latin America enjoys linguistic unity.

There is then the question of religion. It is easy to assert, as conservatives do, that Latin America is Roman Catholic. It is true that the Jews and the Protestants are minority groups, but much of Latin America is agnostic, having kept only the forms of Catholicism, and the old antagonism between clericals and anticlericals is still felt. Anticlericalism is just below the surface in Argentina, the success of President Frei is stimulating anticlericalism in Chile, while in Guatemala the military government allied itself with the Church and sponsored a law to introduce religious education in the schools, thus undoing the historic work of President Justo Rufino Barrios (1873-85), who effected the separation of church and state. The Church may thus have won a temporary victory in Guatemala, but the military no longer controls the government and there is trouble ahead. It is, therefore, untrue to say flatly that Latin America is Catholic, but certainly there is not in Latin America the religious divergence and lack of unity which one finds in, say, Africa or Asia. Except for Australasia, Latin America is in religion the least disunited continent in the world.

It is difficult to bring psychological unity to a continent marked by extremes of poverty and wealth. The wealth of Argentina used to be in sharp contrast with the poverty of the rest of Latin America and was the principal cause of its neighbors' resentment. Today Venezuela has the highest per capita income in Latin America—\$1,120 per annum, as compared with less than \$100 in Bolivia. This was why Venezuela was slow to join LAFTA (Latin American Free Trade Association), but there is enough misery and confusion, and incidentally enough race mixture, in Venezuela, to make it less an object of envy than Argentina used to be. Economic differences cause disunity within the countries of Latin America, but no longer set one country against another.

Latin America is a land of youth. About 40 per cent of the people are under the age of 15. This youth is less concerned than were its elders with the bitter nationalistic rivalries which once divided Latin America. Although they do not formulate the attitude clearly, they feel themselves increasingly Latin American, or at least set apart from the United States. This is so even though the youth is the most Americanized sector of the population. There is strength in this unity, at least potential strength, since

the population is already considerably more than that of Anglo-America, and the disparity is increasing. It is true that Brazil with its 80 million people still feels scornful of the *republiquetas* of Middle America, but a similar disparity has in fact facilitated the unity of the USSR. In its relationship with the United States, Latin America stresses its manpower just as China does vis-à-vis Russia. Indeed, the relationship between the United States and Latin America has marked similarities with the earlier relationship between the USSR and Communist China. It is not a very encouraging thought.

All in all, it may be said that Latin America has a considerable degree of cultural unity.

Geography and the Economy


The United States, Russia and Continental Europe have a kind of geographical solidity which facilitates union. Not so Latin America. It is divided into Portuguese America, i.e., Brazil, which does have geographical solidity, and Spanish America. Spanish America stretches 5,000 miles from Mexico to Cape Horn and is only 30 miles wide in Panama. Brazil has geographical unity, and so does South America, but Spanish America and Latin America do not. Middle America (Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean) includes in addition a medley of islands, some of which are part of Spanish America, while others represent different cultural and political traditions and have only a mild, albeit growing, interest in Latin America. It might be argued that Puerto Rico is slowly moving back into the Spanish American orbit, and that the British, Dutch and French territories will have to find their place within the Middle American system. This would enhance the geographical unity of "Latin" America.

Economically, Latin America may be divided into Middle and South America, the former being clearly within the United States sphere, the latter leading a more independent economic life, with important ties to Europe and the Orient. Mexico is the United States' best customer. The United States exports to Mexico far more than it imports. Invisible exports such as tourism have more than made up the difference; the United States takes some 75 per cent of the exports of Central America.

The Caribbean islands look toward the United States and Europe and are disgregated from Latin America proper. Venezuela and the Guianas are not effectively a part of South America, since their ties likewise are with the United States and Europe, and they should, at least for the present, be included in Middle America.

In South America the picture is different. Peru is perhaps the country most closely tied to the United States commercially, but even there U.S. imports were rather less than 50 per cent of total imports. All the countries of South America wish to break the economic hold of the United States, and increased trade with Europe, the Soviet bloc, even China is seen as a means. The present favorable attitude of the Brazilian military government toward U.S. investment does not invalidate this trend.

LAFTA has its headquarters in Montevideo, the South American capital farthest away from Middle America. It was chosen because of its location between the two principal trading nations of South America, Brazil and Argen-



Vadillo, La Prensa (Mexico): Ben Roth

tina, whose economics are complementary. Mexico is the only non-South American country belonging to LAFTA, and its affiliation has few practical consequences. Mexico simply hoped that LAFTA would provide an easy entry to the markets of South America. The Central American Common Market has made substantial progress, but it is at present independent of LAFTA, and much more under U.S. influence. The treaty creating the Central American Common Market was signed by Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua in August, 1961. Costa Rica joined in 1963.

Excellent research on the economic problems of Latin America is being done by ECLA, the Economic Commission for Latin America, a regional office of the United Nations with headquarters in Santiago de Chile. It operates in the theoretical field, while LAFTA is a practical organization. Under Raúl Prebisch, ECLA became a focus of Latin American structuralist doctrine. There is an ECLA center for Middle America in Mexico City, so that in practice the Santiago office devotes its efforts to the study of South America.

How far is South America, excluding perhaps Venezuela and the Guianas, a united continent? Brazil looks toward the Atlantic and turns its back on Spanish America, for which it feels little cordiality or respect. More and more, Brazil regards itself as a great power in its own right, belonging to a different league from the Spanish American countries, even those of South America. It claims a popu-

lation of more than 85 million, which will rise to 100 million by 1970 and to 200 million by the year 2000. Sao Paulo is said to have 6 million inhabitants and to be not only South America's largest but also the world's fastest growing city. To equate numbers with progress and greatness may be naive and shortsighted, but like most other Latin American countries, Brazil has not yet learned that a large population is not necessarily the first goal. Yet, with half the population of South America, Brazil is bound to be a Gulliver surrounded by Lilliputians.

South America has always been a hollow continent. The bulk of the population was, for a series of historic reasons, located close to the coast or in highlands relatively near the coast. In different ways, the governments of Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia and Venezuela are attempting to move into the heartland. When the process is completed, South America will have a sense of unity which the fragmented occupation of today does not permit. The lofty Andes separate Peruvian Amazonas from the coastal area where Lima is located, and the Peruvians have long feared that as Brazil moves westward it will absorb the vast area belonging to Peru, which in reality is a continuation of Brazilian Amazonas. The possible presence of oil deposits in the area has only increased Peruvian anxiety. Brazil, which needs oil badly, has historically expanded its boundaries by astute diplomacy into the area of Spanish America. Hence, President Belaúnde's dream of opening up the eastern two-thirds of Peru as part of the country's economic system. He hopes, with the assistance of the Alliance for Progress, to provide the communications necessary to link coastal Peru with Amazonas, and foreign capital is offered a ten-year tax holiday to establish new enterprises there. The American road-machine manufacturer, Le Tourneau, opened the way, but the silence surrounding his impressive efforts to settle parts of Peruvian Amazonas suggests that they have not been conspicuously successful. However, though this colonization process is bound to be slow, there is little doubt that it will take place.

Despite fears and animosities, time is on the side of Brazil. It seems clear that eventually this colossus will have strung around its neck, like beads, a series of lesser countries from the Guianas to Uruguay. Although there is a lack of warmth, South American unity will be achieved willy-nilly around Brazil. Once more we see a continent divided into Middle and South America, with the Guianas, Venezuela and Colombia having the dual status of borderlands. It is unlikely that there will be complete economic integration of both Middle and South America.

Politics Down the Middle

While Castrophobia is not a widespread phenomenon in Latin America, admiration for present-day Cuba seems to be waning. First, the novelty of Castro has worn off, and everyone is slightly bored by the continuing impasse between Cuba and the United States. While the failure of Cuba to make a great leap forward may be explained in part by the fact that international sugar prices have fallen sharply, the hard truth is that the Castro regime has not fulfilled the hopes so many Latin Americans placed in it. They tend to feel that it will be some time before prosper-

ity shines on Cuba. The Castro regime is supposedly some \$900 million in debt to the Soviet bloc, and its reserves of Western currencies are diminishing.

The power elite in Latin America, through its control of press and radio, constantly attempts to discredit any regime or system to the left of Center. Cuba's difficulties are played up, with no mention of its achievements and no reference to the fact that, whatever the evils of communism, the principal problem has been a new decline in the price of sugar. The "dance of the millions" in the twenties was followed by the depression of the thirties, under capitalism, so it is misleading to attribute all of Cuba's woes to Castro. The problems of tropical agriculture have affected other areas. The Dominican Republic, Costa Rica and even Haiti are all regarded as politically and economically reliable, yet in all three countries the GNP is rising more slowly than the population—i.e., the standard of living is falling.

American capitalism has accepted the success of the Christian Democratic movement in Chile as the lesser of two evils, preferring President Frei's "Revolution with Freedom" to the Castro-type revolution promoted by Salvador Allende. Had Allende won, it is probable that the United States would have done everything in its power to bring about his overthrow. The Frei administration wants good relations with Washington, and the Ambassador to the United States, Radomiro Tomic, is trying to live down his anti-American reputation. While Frei is not as acceptable to U.S. business as was President Alessandri, the agreement he reached with the copper companies seems to satisfy both sides. By "Chileanizing" their subsidiaries and accepting a minority role in them, the U.S. companies will improve their image and actually gain financially. Their taxes have been reduced, and the nationalized companies are free to sell copper to the Communist countries, something which as U.S. companies they were forbidden to do. It is, however, doubtful that Frei can carry out his plan to double copper output by 1970, making Chile the world's leading producer. The euphoria which surrounds the Christian Democratic movement in Chile should not infect our judgment. In Europe the movement has passed its peak, and it is doubtful that in Latin America it will have wide success. Latin America today, like most of the Western world, is largely an agnostic society, and it is difficult to provide unity on the basis of Christianity—even of Christian Socialism.

The simple fact is that the United States likes military regimes in Latin America. They are good for business—or at least they appear to be. For example, the recent Ecuadorian military junta performed admirably from the viewpoint of U.S. business. The sucre remained stable at about 18.5 to the dollar. The Ecuadorian Government signed all three investment guaranty programs of the U.S. Government. The American business community loves Paraguay. That Paraguay is the focal point for large-scale smuggling operations is regarded as irrelevant. All the economic indicators show that business is good, and the guaraní has remained pegged at a stable rate. New roads built with the help of the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank are strengthening the economic infra-structure of the country. The triumph of the military in Brazil and Argentina was also

welcomed by the North American business community, which is little concerned with the fate of Latin American democracy.

A number of countries have middle-of-the-road governments. Uruguay is still one of them, despite the fact that its Swiss council-type government has been abolished and a general is now president. Mexico, Costa Rica, Panama, Venezuela, Colombia and Peru have moderate governments, economically attuned to the United States.

The political systems of Latin America are clearly extremely variegated. Is there beneath the surface a trend toward political unity? If so, what is the common denominator? Despite recent victories of the pro-United States military, the deep trend seems to be toward a "third position," following the lead neither of the United States nor of Russia but rather the example of the Labour government in England and the moderate governments of Scandinavia. Even the military may assert their independence à la de Gaulle. This desire for a Latin America which will be politically equidistant from the United States and Europe is especially evident in South America, whose geographical position (it should be called Southeast America) will be reflected in a political *rapprochement* with Europe. Some countries will seek also a *rapprochement* with Africa. Brazil initiated this trend under President Goulart.

What steps are being taken to unify Latin America? A parliamentary union is projected and, in view of the historical belief of Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) that it was a party destined to lead a united Latin America toward moderate socialism, it is significant that the parliamentary union is sponsored by Peru and that the Aprista Party has assumed the leadership. Sen. Luis Alberto Sánchez and Deputy Andrés Townsend were the organizers of a conference held in Lima in December, 1964, where sessions were devoted to three topics: the economic, social and political integration of Latin America. The committee studying the last topic considered procedures for the formation of a permanent "Latin American Parliament," and a committee headed by Luis Beltrán Prieto of Venezuela was appointed to coordinate plans for its creation. The new organization has its headquarters in Lima, and Andrés Townsend has been elected secretary general. Mexico sent only observers to the conference, apparently not wishing to become integrated into a parliamentary system with headquarters in Lima. The new organization hopes to stimulate the unification of South America on the basis of parliamentary democracy. The triumph of the military in Brazil and Argentina has at least temporarily shattered these hopes, and it is doubtful that there will ever be more than a token adherence from Middle America.

The Capitals of Confederation

LAFTA should succeed in unifying South America economically, at least to some degree, but political unification remains in suspense. Middle America will probably continue to function outside the system. Before it can become integrated with South America, it must integrate itself, and this process is slow to the point of being interminable. Emotionally, much of Middle America will

be attuned to South America; politically and economically, it is inexorably in the sphere of the United States. The distinction between Middle and South America was already recognized by President Theodore Roosevelt. He reserved the Big Stick policy for the Middle American countries, and wished to treat the South American countries as partners. This was evident in his sponsorship of the Pan American Conference held at Rio de Janeiro in 1906.

In conclusion, the long-term outlook is for an Anglo-American bloc in North America, a Luso-Hispanic system in South America, with the lands of Middle America forming bridges between the two foci. Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean will face both north and south. The South American system will have three "capitals." Montevideo, the seat of LAFTA, will perform a role similar to that of Brussels in the European Common Market; Santiago de Chile will be the center for technical studies in economics and sociology; Lima will be the seat of the parliamentary union, the Strasbourg of South America. South America will be a confederation rather

than a federation, somewhat like the Europe envisaged by de Gaulle.

This does not mean that the Pan American system will disappear. It may even be strengthened as a multilateral vehicle for relations between the United States and Latin America. No one in Washington wants the inter-American system weakened and its place usurped by a Latin American union. Yet the inter-American system and the Latin American union will in the long run have to reach a working compromise, just as NATO will have to learn to live with de Gaulle's Europe.

The road to Latin American unity will be long and rough; the terrain must be carefully mapped. This task has been entrusted to the Institute for Latin American Integration, which the Inter-American Development Bank has established in Buenos Aires. After the sweeping generalizations one must expect from President Johnson and his fellow politicians at Punta del Este, this institute, working with such organizations at LAFTA and ECLA, will have to give meaning and substance to the oratory.

COLEMAN REPORT

WHY THE SCHOOLS FLUNK OUT

CHARLES S. BENSON

Mr. Benson is associate professor of education, University of California. He is the author of The Economics of Public Education (Houghton Mifflin) and other books in the field.

In July of 1966 the U.S. Office of Education issued *Equality of Educational Opportunity* (Government Printing Office, 737 pp., \$4.25), known now as the Coleman Report. The principal authors and research directors of this report are Profs. James S. Coleman (Johns Hopkins) and Ernest Q. Campbell (Vanderbilt), and Alexander Mood, Assistant Commissioner for Educational Statistics, USOE. The report, dealing with a massive social science investigation, was prepared in response to the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which reads in one section: "The Commissioner [of Education] shall conduct a survey . . . concerning the lack of availability of equal educational opportunities for individuals by reasons of race, color, religion, or national origin in public educational institutions. . . ." Presumably, the research was to assist in shaping national educational policy; however, in my opinion, the report will have an influence on state and local policy far exceeding its effects at the national level. Further, the report will intensify efforts to improve the school performance of children coming from the lower socio-economic strata, regardless of their racial, ethnic or religious origin.

The Coleman study involved nearly 60,000 school-teachers and 645,000 students in a statistical sample of schools broadly representative of public education in this country. Information was obtained about the school plant (conditions of classrooms, class size, equipment, books, libraries, etc.), about teachers (education, father's education and occupation, attitudes toward teaching children

of different abilities, etc.), and about principals and superintendents. Aptitude and achievement tests were given to pupils in the sample schools, and teachers were given a short test for verbal facility. The study group obtained information about the family background of the students (size of family, education of parents, occupation, use of leisure hours, and so on). Lastly, the students were questioned on their educational aspirations—how they felt about school, how much control they felt they had over their destinies, their occupational goals.

Because the Coleman Report appeared some nine months ago and has been extensively reviewed (e.g., *Science*, December 9, 1966), I shall confine myself here to an important question that stems directly from perhaps the three least disputed conclusions of the study. The first of these is that in school achievement, "The differences between whites and other social and ethnic groups (excluding Orientals) is great indeed. . . . The Negroes' averages tend to be about one standard deviation below those of the whites, which means that about 85 per cent of the Negro scores are below the white average." The second conclusion is that "Observing the nationwide averages . . . it appears that school children of all groups differ relatively little in the physical school facilities available." And speaking of teachers: "There is clearly no tendency for the teachers of one group of pupils to be either more mature or more recently trained." And the third conclusion is that differences which are observed in school environment have relatively little effect on the achievement of the pupils. These three conclusions can be reduced to two statements (in economists' jargon): (1) School outputs are variable; (2) in determining school outputs, pupil inputs dominate school inputs. The question I want to raise is why this second statement should



be characteristic of American education in the late 1960s.

Why is it still true that the performance of students is shaped primarily by what they themselves bring to the schools, out of their family background, when at least ten years ago any alert social observer could see that our economy was rapidly reducing both the relative and the absolute number of unskilled jobs? I think a non-educator might look at the matter this way. "For all kinds of reasons, children from poor homes have a hard time doing school work. Once they fall behind in the elementary grades, there is little in the home to give them that extra push they need to catch up and stay up with the class. If these young people leave school without being able to read and do numbers at about the eighth grade level, they are going to have a poor chance of getting a job and holding it. So it would make sense to give these children some extra care in school, in order that they can lead decent, productive and independent lives."

Humanity calls for this approach, because a school failure is a cripple in our high speed, verbal and mathematically oriented modern world. And the coldest economic considerations call for this approach because the school failures of today are the welfare cases of tomorrow and the parents of the next generation of welfare cases. Yet I would estimate that the schools in the United States are producing about 500,000 "graduates" a year who lack eighth grade skills in the basic subjects.

Our country excels all others in the rate at which it is dispensing with unskilled labor. The effect of the new \$1.50 minimum wage in New York in knocking bootblacks out of work is simply a recent example of a pervasive social movement. At the same time, our school system seems utterly unable to serve pupils who have environmental handicaps. The scope of the problem was indicated by the U.S. Department of Commerce, when it pointed out in the January issue of *Survey of Current Business* that one out of three unemployed persons is a teen-ager, though teen-agers represent only 10 per cent of the labor force. The department added: "This trend

points up the difficulties teen-agers are experiencing in securing employment in our expanding economy when a premium is placed on skill and experience."

A brief discussion—I can do no more than open the topic—of why the American educational system is so unaccommodating to the difficulties of lower-class youth may offer clues as to what can be done to make their school years effective.

The place to start is with the classroom teacher, and the first point to note is that the elementary teacher (and it is in the elementary grades that learning retardation can be most effectively prevented or checked) has to teach a large number of subjects each day. Often this requirement is expressed in state law, which sometimes even specifies a minimum number of minutes each day that must be devoted to a given subject. When one takes account of the time required for opening exercises, recess, lunch and various announcements and the time that goes into dealing with six to eight required subjects, one can see that the teacher has not the flexibility in her working day to bring a certain group of children over the hurdles, for example, in reading and arithmetic. The teacher cannot spend the better part of two weeks, say, in intensive instruction to make sure that all her pupils are ready for the next stage in reading instruction. We assume that our schools evolved from English models, but the proliferation of subjects and the inflexibility of the elementary school day in this country remind one more of Latin American practice—and Latin American schools are notorious for wastage in the primary grades.

Apparently, these rigid requirements for the use of the teachers' time have been established in response to pressure from teachers' groups, organized along subject lines: reading, mathematics, foreign language, physical education, music, social studies, etc. Temperance and patriotic groups have also had a hand in fracturing the school day. The situation, in my view, does not represent caprice by state legislators, though the legislators might be charged with giving in too handily to the pressure from the various interest groups. Some confirmation of my point of view is afforded by the National Advisory Council on the Education of Disadvantaged Children, which in two reports (November 25, 1966, and January 31, 1967) has emphasized the remarkable gains in pupil achievement that take place in summer schools. In its November report the council stated "... teachers were able to depart from prescribed texts and try new materials that encouraged student participation and progress at one's own pace. Perhaps it is simply the more relaxed atmosphere that melted barriers between teachers and pupils."

A second point to note about the classroom teacher's work is that the function of teaching is downgraded in our academic society. In higher education, research and publication are more highly valued than teaching; in the lower schools, teaching plays second fiddle to administration. Among experienced teachers in a given district, the salary differential between the least trained teacher and the most highly trained will be in the order of \$1,500 to \$2,000 (in actual figures—the "salary schedule" may indicate otherwise). But the differential between the most

highly trained teacher and a middle-level school administrator, e.g., a principal, will be in the order of \$4,000 to \$6,000. The gap in status between teacher and administrator is even wider than the pay scales would indicate. An ambitious young recruit to the district can easily figure where to place his bets.

As far as I know, the favored position of the administrator may be characteristic of education throughout the world, but the American practice is special in one regard: good teaching, based on advanced knowledge of one's subject and of pedagogy, is not the route to the middle-management positions. Some principals are ex-coaches, some are men who get the nod for their skills in public relations, but in any case their course work after the B.A. has been in the study of administration, not in the study of subject or pedagogy. In the United States, unlike other countries, the principal is not the "principal teacher" or headmaster, a symbol of pedagogical excellence who continues to serve part time in the schoolroom. In any decent sized school in our country he is purely an office manager. State certification requirements see to this.

This downgrading of the teaching function destroys the incentive of teachers to become aware of the new and growing body of evidence about how best to instruct children who display blocks to learning. More fundamentally, it destroys the incentive to maintain the contact with academic disciplines that is necessary for the teacher who would retain a vital, energetic and contagious interest in the learning process.

Another peculiar and significant feature of American education is the vulnerability of the teacher to parental criticism. It is not, of course, a matter of the teacher's having his job at stake—he usually has tenure—but simply that after a day's work the teacher does not enjoy facing the caustic, sarcastic tongue of irate parents—and in our country irate parents have direct access to the classroom. Teachers feel that if they were to devote an unusual amount of their energy to helping lower-class children keep up in their school work, they would be criticized by middle-class parents—or by any parent whose child manages to do well—on the ground that such special attention is unfair. Teachers thus bend to the majority and take the position that in public education each child is entitled to the same amount of service. (Almost the only exceptions to this notion that our society has genuinely accepted are the special provisions made for the seriously handicapped and for the very gifted.)

There is another way to go about the problem of allocating educational resources, and I think it is a better way. (1) Establish minimum learning objectives for various ages of children. (2) Allocate resources sufficient to assure that these objectives are fulfilled. (3) Then, use the remaining resources (there would be some left over) to discover and develop talent in whatever class of society it can be found.

Why does not the school superintendent seek such a definition of operational objectives and thus provide himself with the power to stand between the teacher and the overzealous parent? An example might work out along these lines. The superintendent might discover that in

the such and so school, 60 per cent of the third graders fell below the first quartile in a state-wide test of reading comprehension. He might then establish the operational objective of reducing the percentage of first quartile third grade readers in that school to, say, 30 per cent. And so on for other subjects and other grades.

But the definition of operational objectives implies that awful thing: comparisons of schools and districts on measures of output (achievement). On January 9 of this year, the American Association of School Administrators came out flat-footed against the Carnegie Foundation's National Assessment of Educational Progress, even though that program was deliberately designed to forestall invidious comparisons. It was also designed to place no pressure on teachers to "teach for the test" (*Science Education*, April, 1966). If the AASA succeeds in blocking this project, the prospects are dim for resolving some of the pedagogical and policy issues raised by the Coleman Report.

The superintendent in American education is himself in a vulnerable position. He is appointed in the ordinary case by an elected board. He has little control over his pupil clientele. Next year's crop of first graders may be poorer pupils than this year's. He has little effective control over the quality of faculty his district employs, and in almost all districts annual recruitment needs are high. He has limited control over his teachers' class loads, beyond the statutory minimum of hours. If he tries to assign his best teachers to disadvantaged schools, he may be in hot water with the unions. Comparisons of achievement test scores over time, or between one school district and another, could quickly turn to the disadvantage of a superintendent. It's his job, not that of the teachers or principals, that's at stake. In these circumstances, one cannot expect superintendents to welcome quantitative assessment of school performance.

I have mentioned teachers, principals and superintendents. Can one expect school boards to take the lead in improving education for the disadvantaged? These boards are really volunteer groups, except in the large cities. That is, one volunteers, more or less, to run for the office and do one's duty. In suburbs or large cities, the boards are overworked—in the cities for bona fide reasons and in the suburbs by the fact that superintendents know very well how to crowd the agenda with trivial items of fiscal administration.

Until operational objectives for our schools are defined, and until school outputs come to be measured against operational objectives, we shall continue to be in the dark about what models of educational programs should be copied in districts across the land. Further, school boards themselves will have little incentive to take advantage of the opportunities given them to minimize school failure. In its 1965 session, the California legislature passed a forward-looking act whereby the state shares costs with local districts in freeing exceptionally qualified teachers to work full time in a single school on reading instruction of pupils in the first three grades. By September, 1966, only forty-four districts out of some 1,200 in the state had chosen to participate in the program, and none of these was a large district. There has

been no sense of urgency about school failure, in spite of its tragic private and social consequences.

Will education of the disadvantaged be improved? Yes. How? Slowly. But the helm has been put over in the great hulk that is our educational system, and a new direction of emphasis has been established. For this, the Coleman Report should receive a large part of the credit. Various policy proposals have been associated with the report: educational parks and central city-suburb sharing of pupils are two that come to mind. I have proposed (*Phi Delta Kappan*, March, 1967) that the instruction

of the disadvantaged be combined with on-the-job training of teachers, using the analogy of the teaching hospital. Other things need to be done. State laws that fracture the elementary school day could be repealed. School districts could place greater rewards before the trained and competent teacher, approximating the rewards received by the administrator. Most important of all, states could insist that there be quantitative assessment of student progress in all elementary and secondary schools, to the end that the educational fraternity begin to think seriously about defining its operational objectives.

BRITAIN'S PRESS CRISIS

RAYMOND WILLIAMS

London

It has been a difficult winter for British newspapers. In the worst moments, it seemed possible that only four or five of the nine surviving national daily papers would be able to continue publication for more than another year. This forecast may have been unduly pessimistic, and there is now some feeling that the situation has eased. Yet it is a fact that the formerly independent *Times* has passed into the control of the combine owned by Lord Thomson, and that our other leading newspaper, *The Guardian*, has been for some months in acute financial difficulties. Among the other papers, only *The Telegraph*, the *Mirror* and the *Express* seem certain of a commercial future. The future of the *Sun*, which replaced the old *Labour Herald*, is particularly doubtful, and there are question marks over the *Mail* and the *Sketch*. The ninth paper, the *Morning Star* (formerly the *Worker*) is in a position of its own, with a small circulation outside the ordinary conditions of commercial publication. What are the causes of this crisis, and what is revealed about the social condition of the British press?


The immediate causes are clear. The July measures of the Wilson government, freezing prices and wages to assist the balance of payments, had the effect of depressing economic activity and led to a decline in advertising revenue. Moreover, there has been for some years a decline in circulations from the very high figures of the fifties. The two most serious papers, *The Times* and *The Guardian*, each with a circulation between 250,000 and 300,000, depend on advertising for about two-thirds of their revenue. Most of the other papers get about half their income from advertising. The decline of advertising has had immediate effects, especially on those papers which were already relatively weak. A situation well known to students of the press is suddenly a national issue.

Some special features of the British press need emphasis. It is of course normal for newspapers in capitalist societies to depend quite heavily on advertising. But in Britain the relationship between circulation and commercial viability is unusual. The daily press is dominated by the eight or nine national papers; the regional or provincial dailies are comparatively unimportant. Papers like *The Times* and *The Guardian*, with generally affluent and

influential readers, can approach commercial survival on relatively small circulations by charging very high rates for rather specialized kinds of advertising. Even so, they cannot hope to break even, and must look to support from associated enterprises. In the popular field, a viable circulation is well in excess of 1 million, and may be approaching 2 million. The last national daily paper to close, the *News Chronicle*, had sales beyond 1 million, and one Sunday paper that closed had more than 2 million. As advertising concentrates in the really high-circulation papers—the *Mirror*, nearly 5 million, and the *Express*, more than 4 million—the other popular papers feel the draft. *The Telegraph*, a middle paper at about 1,300,000, is secured by its share of specialized advertising, but the *Sun*, at about the same figure but with only a popular readership, and the *Sketch*, with about 800,000, are very exposed. Even the *Mail*, at better than 2 million, seems to many people insecure.

It is then obvious that this particular British ratio, in which the circulation figure for survival gets higher and higher, raises special problems. It is directly related to an increasing concentration of control. Already some seven out of eight copies of all national morning papers are controlled by three groups, while two of these same groups, with another, control seven out of eight copies of Sunday papers. There are extensive associated holdings, and some other powerful combines, in the provincial evening and weekly press, and in magazine publishing, where at the commercial level the largest newspaper group (Cecil King's International Publishing Corporation, which controls the *Mirror* and the *Sun*) holds a near monopoly.

Some of us have been pointing to the political implications of this development for some time. In 1961, after the last wave of closures, and when it was evident that many of these same newspaper interests had holdings in the majority service of the commercial television companies, I wrote a book, *Communications*, which got some discussion. It was reissued this winter, by coincidence, just as the renewed crisis became apparent, and it was interesting to see how journalists and politicians who had agreed to let the issues ride, in the intervening years, suddenly came on the telephone. There were the makings of a useful discussion, and for the first time in years I got some support for the only proposals which seemed to me



Jensen, Sunday Telegraph (London): Ben Roth

to meet the problem: public ownership of the newsprint industry; government intervention to own certain printing works, which would be leased on contract to threatened newspapers outside the big combines; these papers to be reorganized as nonprofit trusts or public companies under the democratic control of the journalists themselves. There was even a moment when some members of the Labour government, to whom the ideas should not, after all, have been unfamiliar, showed interest. Meanwhile, however, a different exercise in persuasion has been under way, and with vastly greater resources. The real cause of the crisis, we are repeatedly told, is the rapacious demands of the printers' unions.

The Labour government, as it always does these days, came to accept, substantially, this absurd explanation. The government's only effective diagnosis of weakness anywhere in the society is the greed and impatience of the working men who built its party and put it into office. In a period of rapid technical change, there are certainly real problems about manpower in the whole printing industry. It is moreover widely agreed that many newspaper managements are inefficient. But this kind of isolated explanation of the general crisis is very shortsighted. The printing unions, defending their members' interests, are fully aware of the degree of monopoly in ownership, and of the drive to technical rationalization, with dismissals, that it produces. The new printing techniques are being introduced in a precise economic structure and in a known social climate. It is then impossible to persuade the unions that the national interest requires them to co-operate in this kind of change. The only interest that can be served, on present lines, is that of the owners. If all the existing papers were made viable by this kind of cost reduction, the social problem would still remain: that in a democratic society there is a totally unacceptable concentration of control over news and opinion.

In fact, the unions are making limited local agreements; in the short term they must. The costs of *The Guardian* have been reduced, after a difficult negotiation, but no sooner did this occur than the price of newsprint was allowed to rise, by an amount that would just about cancel the saving. All the real elements of the crisis are still present, and it can be expected to erupt again. That there is now a policy on the Left, based on public ownership of newsprint and a state printing corporation, is one welcome result. But it must then be added that in this, as in every other field, the Left no longer includes the Labour government.

Beyond the special features of the British situation, the communications crisis is now general in every capitalist society. Advertising has passed from being a convenient support to its present position as the form of communication on which all other major forms have come to depend. England had a similar fight about local broadcasting and only just won, preserving the public-service principle, by a difficult crash campaign which was supported by the musicians' union and which eventually (it is said) reversed a cabinet decision in favor of commercialism. It is almost a full-time job to work for democratic communications against the now fantastic economic and political pressures of managed capitalism. It does not help that the only Socialist communications policy that most people know about is the Russian and other Communist experiences of state monopoly and control. But for a time, this winter, as liberal papers like *The Guardian* felt the real pressures of this society, something like a democratic Socialist alternative began to emerge at a fully public level. Now it is quiet again, but since by the end of this decade Britain will probably have only three or four national morning papers, with no corresponding revival of an independent regional press, we have evidently not heard the last of the crisis in communications.

BOOKS & THE ARTS

Forms of Modern Sinology

STUDENT NATIONALISM IN CHINA 1927-1937. By John Israel. Stanford University Press. 253 pp. \$7.50.

WHEN CHINA WAKES. By Robert Guillain. Walker & Co. 268 pp. \$5.95.

PEKING AND PEOPLE'S WARS. By Brig. General Samuel B. Griffith II, USMC (Ret.). Frederick A. Praeger. 142 pp. \$4.95.

JONATHAN MIRSKY

Mr. Mirsky teaches Chinese at Dartmouth College. He is one of the contributors to *Peace in Vietnam: A New Approach in Southeast Asia* (Hill and Wang).

These books illustrate three of the most common forms of modern Sinology. Thus they are not merely useful (or useless) for the information they do (or do not) contain but for the impulses and predilections they expose; China is an absorbing subject and the market for books is wide. Let us deal first with the study which is most valuable and will sell least well.

John Israel teaches Chinese history at Claremont Men's College. *Student Nationalism in China, 1927-1937*, is a detailed, dissertation-like study of the development of student political awareness, which focused on Japanese threats to Chinese national integrity. Professor Israel's book was completed long before 1966, when the students of Peking, Shanghai and Nanking poured into the streets, and it is not part of the book's intention to create any false analogies between earlier student demonstrations and the present Red Guard movement. But certain parallels are astonishing.

The streets of these cities had witnessed wild student demonstrations as early as 1919, when the Versailles powers acquiesced to Japanese demands in north China. This was the beginning of the celebrated May 4 Movement. "The salient features of the student movement in subsequent years—the countrywide unity, the slogans denouncing Japanese imperialists and Chinese traitors, the demonstrations, the use of modern propaganda methods, the crusades to educate and indoctrinate workers and peasants, can be traced back to May Fourth."

From then on, Israel writes, it was "common to see thousands of high school and college youths surging through the streets demanding resistance to imperial-

ist insults or an end to unpopular policies in their own government."

When one reads with mounting bewilderment accounts of Red Guard activity in China today, certain questions invariably recur: Who are the demonstrators? What do they want? Is their activity spontaneous? There is very little to go on since most sources, either Chinese or Western, are special pleading. But history is often illuminating, and here again the past comes to our aid.

The student movements throughout the twenties and thirties were uncoordinated, and often fluctuated madly in their momentum. Nationalism alone provided cohesion: save China from Japanese aggression and stiffen the resolve of the government. During the period between 1921 and 1939, the Communist movement developed and so did Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang (KMT). Each party competed for the allegiance of the students.

Mao Tse-tung, who began his political life as a middle school agitator, realized very early the importance of giving leadership to students and exploiting their fervor. So did Chiang Kai-shek. A significant difference from Chinese students of today is that the youths between the two wars were from an economic elite. But Chinese young people in school today, although usually from poor families, take on "student" attitudes much as they always have. Mao finds this disturbing, for another class is formed irrespective of income. A quick awareness develops among students of the gulf between themselves and the peasants. In absolute numbers, although there are vastly more now, upper-level students still form a tiny minority in the population.

The mood of these students before 1930, as described by themselves, was "pessimistic," "drifting" and "romantic." Public service was a despised profession, since civil war, poverty and bottomless KMT corruption continuously dashed the spirits of the young. But in 1931 further Japanese incursions in north China galvanized the students. Scenes familiar to China watchers today ensued as:

Students felt duty bound to alert their less sophisticated countrymen to the gravity of the national crisis. . . . Scores of . . . volunteers were analyz-

ing the causes of the Manchurian situation for the uncultured masses of Peiping (not then China's capital) and its environs. In the Yangtze delta, even grammar school children enlisted in the crusade. A Christian missionary was surprised to see some fifty primary school pupils all wearing red crepe armbands board his train . . . they had cut classes to barnstorm the countryside delivering impassioned speeches and distributing pamphlets.

As in today's China, such activity posed a considerable problem for the government: it could either encourage and guide the movement or attempt to suppress it. Over the next year both courses were tried. Chiang Kai-shek was unsuccessful in controlling the students who in Shanghai, for instance, struck for a week against government orders. On September 28, 1931, thousands of youths marched on the Foreign Ministry, eventually broke in, and nearly beat to death the Foreign Minister whom they accused of being a traitor for not resisting Japan. (This should be remembered by those who maintain that current public humiliation of high officials is unprecedented.)

Thereafter, waves of student petitioners rolled for months through the streets of Nanking. Although trains were commandeered and students traveled into the capital from Shanghai and Peking, the government became increasingly adept at handling the mobs:

Many accepted official hospitality. After a group had been fed and lodged under close surveillance its leaders would be summoned to the Kuomintang's Ministry of Propaganda for an intimate talk. . . . High level party and government officials would speak to the assembled students: . . . Chiang Kai-shek would usually appear to say a few words. . . . Their trip had been a success: they had been well fed, they had seen the capital, and Chairman Chiang had spoken to them in person.

On another occasion students waited all night freezing in the snow outside KMT party headquarters. "They refused to leave until they had seen the Chairman." When he finally appeared, he said: "I am deeply pleased to see you, motivated by patriotic ardor, coming to the capital to petition. I resolved long ago to devote my life to the party and the nation." Then, like a modern Chou En-lai, he added: "You students can ful-

fill your duties as citizens by calmly studying and supporting the government."

(On November 26, 1966, according to *Peking Review*: "Although temperatures were almost sub-zero on the 25th, the happy news that Chairman Mao was going to receive them warmed the hearts of our young fighters.")

Further crises ensued in Peking. In December, 1931, "Peiping's universities were completely disorganized. Several presidents had resigned, and classrooms were empty." In Nanking, students forced government officials into hiding. The government could stand it no longer. Students were ordered to stay off trains. Airplanes dropped leaflets cautioning them that Nanking's patience was stretching.

(On January 9, 1967, a message was sent by the Communist Central Committee to "revolutionaries" in Shanghai urging those "who are exchanging revolutionary experiences in other parts of the country to return to Shanghai immediately so that the great cultural revolution in their own units can be fulfilled.")

By 1935, Japanese threats and demands mounted, accompanied by an escalating student activity. The student unions in Peking resolved to "rally the oppressed masses" against the enemy. Students in Peking and Tientsin divided themselves into small units and marched into the countryside in long columns to talk to the peasants. "Patriotic songs, didactic plays and impassioned speeches in a babel of dialects filled the air of the winter-bound villages."

(*Peking Review* of November 25, 1966, reports: "In the last few months, revolutionary students and teachers of higher educational institutes and middle schools throughout the country have made extensive contacts to exchange revolutionary experience. . . . The revolutionary young fighters spread Mao Tse-tung's thought along the way, distributed handbills printed with quotations from Chairman Mao, and helped people's

communes and production teams to put out blackboard newspapers. . . .")

An important lesson had been learned. According to Israel: "Although their endeavors had rendered the area (Hopei) more susceptible to wartime guerrilla activities, the strongest impact had undoubtedly been not on the peasants but on the students who gained first-hand knowledge of the life and thought of China's masses and became aware of the enormous problems of communication. This was a unique preparation for war and revolution."

(*Peking Review* of November 25, 1966: "These wide contacts with the masses have helped the long marchers to understand profoundly the boundless love, faith in, and veneration for Chairman Mao . . . on the part of the masses. . . .")

Israel stresses the confusion in the minds of China's youth in the decades after World War I. They were educated, often Western-oriented, and always *Chinese*. The Communists pulled at them from one side: from the other came the pull of "grandfathers who still smoked opium and fathers who maintained concubines." What moved these students was *nationalism*, an independent China "neither traditionalistic nor aggressive." Like the students of China today, they were at odds with their teachers and leaders, men who feared and admired the West, but who were only courageous enough to inch their country into the 20th century. Leninism, very gradually, came to appear progressive, revolutionary and, most important, as the road to national salvation.

When *China Wakes* goes on from where Israel leaves us. Without the historical framework provided by painstaking research such as Israel's, much of what Guillain says would be nothing but assertion, to be taken on faith.

Guillain is an experienced traveler in Asia, and a profound analyst, much in the style of Jean Lacouture. Such French journalists, though they sometimes over-write, seem to get nearer the heart of the matter than do their American counterparts. This is an account of Guillain's 1964 trip to China, his first in nine years. He uses trips to large cities, communes and industrial sites as springboards into speculation. Even a *non-visit* to Lanchow, the center of atomic research, gives rise to an illuminating chapter on China's nuclear weapons, made possible, he feels, by enforced backwardness elsewhere in the country which the Chinese, mindful of Russian "softness," term a virtue.

Guillain's most interesting flights of imagination come in his last chapter,

PROPHETIC

...on Democracy's rocky road (1896)

PROBLEMS OF MODERN DEMOCRACY

Political and Economic Essays

By Edwin Lawrence Godkin

Edited by Morton Keller

"To my generation," wrote William James, "Godkin's was certainly the towering influence in all thought concerning public affairs." He was *The Nation's* first editor and later editor-in-chief of the *New York Evening Post*. This book drew on thirty years of his thought and concern over "the unhappy course of American democracy." A dissenter in his own time, Godkin single-handedly established the tradition of intellectual involvement in government and of sustained, ironic criticism of public institutions that are dear to so many today. \$5.95

...on the political process (1908)

THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT

By Arthur F. Bentley

Edited by Peter H. Odegard

A devastating indictment of the political science of its time, this is still, as Mr. Odegard's penetrating commentary shows, one of the few indispensable books in the literature of behavioral science. It was a startling breakthrough in the study of political behavior, showing that government is essentially an operation of "process, action, change," and that as such it can be analyzed objectively. Largely ignored in its day, it is now generally regarded as a seminal contribution to modern political analysis and its author one of the field's most creative pioneers. \$6.95

...on the American vision (1909)

THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE

By Herbert Croly

Edited by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.

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"The New Generation and China After Mao." The Chinese, he is sure, are determined that those who expect a relaxation after Mao dies, will be proved wrong: "Post-Mao China is also planned by Mao. The master has finished his life work."


It is revisionism which is the enemy and when the younger generation takes over, its mind must be pure. At this point Guillain makes his only serious error—and a year ago such a prophecy could be made safely: "In today's China organized opposition to the regime would be unthinkable, and any opposition as such has been eliminated." (He affirms that it is "risky" to make such a guess.) But his other insights are important. He speaks, for instance, of the "loathing for agricultural work" among young intellectuals, and of how being sent to the land is a "catastrophe." As reported in *Peking Review*, one of the recent charges brought against the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee is that it tried to "stir up dissatisfaction" by obstructing "the inevitable road" of "integration of students with peasants and workers." (The particular crime, in this instance, was "paying the students relatively high wages for labor.")

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The question which bothers Guillain and many others—and which he repeatedly sought the answer to in China—is how can revisionists still exist after years of revolution. He makes the interesting speculation that, as in Russia, it is among the *contented* that opposition to Mao tends to form, "among those whom the beginnings of comfort and wealth have caused to place . . . personal interest above the common good." Thus, Guillain points out that bourgeois concepts such as "well-being," "love," "a good life" and "happiness" are constantly denounced, since they distract young people from a vision of perhaps centuries of toil during which not only China but all the downtrodden will have to be lifted from oppression and backwardness. Guillain was told that *eight* generations might be required for such a task!

For Brig. Gen. Samuel B. Griffith II, USMC (Ret.), the task as envisaged by Mao will require terrible deeds: "The Chinese are masters of espionage, propaganda, agitation, subversion, bribery, blackmail and selective terror," and they will apply these methods in target countries to create "storm centers of world revolution."

This is not the raving of an unsophisticated thug. Griffith's Oxford doctoral dissertation was published as *The Art of War*. It is a careful and fascinating study of a 4th century B.C. Chinese military strategist whose ideas on guerrilla-type warfare plainly underlie those of Mao Tse-tung, on whose military outlook Griffith has also written with authority. It is therefore very sad to see that Praeger has seen fit to commission such a slapdash and vulgar polemic. Is the hand of the CIA (which sponsors this publisher) or of the USIA (which commissioned the manuscript itself) showing a little too plainly?

Griffith's essay is attached to the now famous Lin Piao speech, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," and to another by Lo Jui-ching, the now disgraced chief of the General Staff. Griffith is badly caught off base by the recent Rand study (and an earlier one in the *Quaker Peace in Vietnam*) which shows that, though verbally bellicose, Lin is actually counseling independence for revolutionary movements. Even McNamara might have trouble finding in Lin Piao's speech a justification for Griffith's assertion that: "The Chinese Communists will not permit the idea of individualism in nations." What Lin Piao actually says is: "To make a revolution and to fight a people's war and be victorious, it is imperative to adhere to the policy

of self-reliance, rely on the strength of the masses in one's own country, and to prepare to carry on the fight independently even when all material aid is cut off." It is no mistake that this speech was delivered on the twentieth birthday of the People's Republic of Vietnam. Hanoi and the NLF were being warned to tighten their belts.

But this is surely, by now, a well-known analysis. How much can we still rely on Griffith's scholarship? On page 5, for instance, we find that in 1927 Mao was: ". . . a minor figure in the councils of the Chinese Communist Party. We may doubt that the Russian members of the International had even heard of him. . . ."

What is the point of this assertion? To debunk some kind of false legend? The fact of the matter is that the "minor figure" was one of the twelve delegates at the first congress of the Chinese Communist Party on July 1, 1921. Mao was elected secretary of this congress which was attended by two Russians. In 1924, at the first national congress of the KMT which included Communists, Mao was again a delegate and one of six Communist alternate members to the General Executive Committee. As for the Comintern never having heard of Mao in 1927, in his excellent biography Jerome Ch'en says of Mao that his famous "Report of an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan," attracted the attention and unqualified praise of the Chairman of the Comintern, Bukharin, who was then Stalin's close ally . . . he described it as excellent and interesting." In the same year the article was translated into Russian and English. Such is anonymity!

Griffith, in his desire to remove any notion that the Chinese Communists might have *appealed* to the peasantry, falls into his own snares. On page 8, in describing the "standard . . . regimentation and militarization of the population," he says: "There was no escaping the omnipresent Party . . . to live, it was mandatory to conform." But on page 9 he describes Chinese "of all classes, particularly the professors and the students, many of whom deserted lecture halls and classrooms and set out to join the Communists." On page 31 we find that the Communist army in "its relationships with the peasants . . . was generally impeccable."

Griffith tells us too that the Chinese are impossible to deal with on the international scene, that "gestures of amity" and "objective diplomatic discussions" are useless when dealing with Peking. Forgetting for a moment that the United States has for years brought ridicule on


We have the last word on The Nation.

the (stressed *thē*; unstressed before a consonant *thə*; unstressed before a vowel *thē*), definite article. 1. (used, esp. before a noun, with a specifying or particularizing effect, as opposed to the indefinite or generalizing force of the indefinite article *a* or *an*): *the book you gave me*; *Come into the house*. 2. (used to mark a proper noun, natural phenomenon, ship, building, time, point of the compass, branch of endeavor, or field of study as something well-known or unique): *the Alps*; *the Queen Elizabeth*; *the past*; *the West*. 3. (used with or as part of a title): *the Duke of Wellington*; *the Reverend John Smith*. 4. (used to mark a noun as indicating the best-known, most approved, most important, most satisfying, etc.): *the skiing center of the U.S.*; *If you're going to work hard, now is the time*. 5. (used to mark a noun as being used generically): *The dog is a quadruped*. 6. (used in place of a possessive pronoun, to note a part of the body or a personal belonging): *He wouldn't be able to play football until the leg mended*. 7. (used before adjectives that are used substantively, to note an individual, a class or number of individuals, or an abstract idea): *to visit the sick*; *from the sublime to the ridiculous*. 8. (used before a modifying adjective to specify or limit its modifying effect): *He took the wrong road and drove miles out of his way*. 9. (used to indicate one particular decade of a lifetime or of a century): *the gay nineties* and *the roaring twenties*. 10. (one of many of a class or type, as of a manufactured item, as opposed to an individual one): *Did you listen to the radio last night?* 11. enough: *He saved until he had the money for a new car. She didn't have the courage to leave*. 12. (used distributively, to note any one separately); for, to, or in each; a or an: *at one dollar the pound*. [ME, OE, uninflected var. of demonstrative pronoun. See **THAT**]

na-tion (nā'shən), *n.* 1. a body of people, associated with a particular territory, that is sufficiently conscious of its unity to seek or to possess a government peculiarly its own. 2. the territory or country itself. 3. a member tribe of an Indian confederation. 4. an aggregation of persons of the same ethnic family, often speaking the same language or cognate languages. [ME < L *nātiō*- (s. of *nātiō*) birth, tribe, equiv. to *nāt(us)* born (ptp. of *nāsci*) + *-iōn-* -ion] —*na'tion-hood*, *n.* —*na'tion-less*, *adj.* —*Syn.* 2. state, commonwealth, kingdom, realm. See **race**.

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itself for pretending the government in "Peiping" does not exist and that Taipei is the capital of China, it would be well to remember that the Chinese have recently concluded treaties on mutually favorable terms with, among others, Pakistan, Burma, Cambodia and Nepal, and that they trade with nearly 100 countries, including West Germany. The Chinese are currently going through an internal upheaval the results of which cannot be foretold; useless generalizations about their *actual* behavior are surely not an aid to American understanding.

Reading this book is like listening to Secretary Rusk on a bad day. "The purpose of the American presence in South Vietnam . . . [is] to put a stop to a Communist aggression directed against the legitimate government and the people of South Vietnam." It is surprising to find reputable scholars still able to make that statement. Almost everyone is now willing to concede that the United States is participating in a civil/anti-colonial war. Indeed, Griffith himself, referring to Asian "xenophobic nationalism," admits on an earlier page that "in the North Vietnamese struggle against the French this appeal was credible . . . foreign troops were present. The slogans of 'anti-im-

perialism' and 'anti-colonialism' found responses simply because in both instances it was clear that the 'foreign devils' were attempting to conquer the country and exploit and oppress the people. The consequence was that thousands participated actively with the communist party operating within broadly based patriotic fronts." Considering the American role in supporting the French, it is hard to see why Griffith assumes that the Vietnamese should now regard us as saviors.

But Griffith, despite a long career of practical affairs, and a record of serious Chinese scholarship, is now so oblivious to the realities of the world in which we and the Chinese live, that he can assert that the enmity of the United States toward China is only a figment of Peking's tortured imagination and cunning. "It is essential to keep revolutionary fervor at a high pitch. This can be done if an external enemy is postulated that threatens the lives and livelihood of the people. If no such demonic figure exists, it is necessary to create one. In China, this Satan is the United States."

Israel and Guillaín tell us that Chinese fears are historic and real.

tion," as Cornelia Otis Skinner says, "only a few."

James Agate, "dean" of English drama critics between 1907 and 1947, called Bernhardt "the great workwoman." Miss Skinner substantiates this designation by remarking that "at sixty-five Madame Sarah continued to spend twelve, sometimes fourteen hours a day in her theatre, rehearsing her repertory, auditioning players, teaching her pupils, reading scripts." In 1891, on a two-year tour which took her halfway around the world, Bernhardt's luggage (apart from theatre equipment) "consisted of forty-five costume crates and some seventy-five trunks for her off-stage dresses, coats, hats, furs and two hundred and fifty pairs of shoes."

I begin with this data to suggest that *Madame Sarah* is not a book about acting but about an actress; and not so much about an actress as about a dazzling personality. And that personality is an emblem for Miss Skinner of something even more fascinating to her, something which I shall name after we have taken a closer look at the evidence on Bernhardt as actress.

Notable appreciations by contemporary French critics are generously strewn through Miss Skinner's biography. Most of them are ecstatic: they assure us that Bernhardt was an unforgettable phenomenon to those who attended her performances. (When I saw her in my student days in Paris, in the next to last play in which she appeared, I was impressed by the fact that though I sat in the gallery and was still unaccustomed to hearing French spoken from the stage, I understood every word she uttered, while the rest of the cast was wholly unintelligible to me.) I nevertheless remain skeptical about most French criticism of acting: it tends to be effusively impressionistic, a kind of literary swoon adjusted to erotic and visceral reactions, rather than to ideas and scrupulous observation.

Henry James and Shaw, both of whom were well aware of Bernhardt's magnetism, are much more reliable witnesses. Here is what Shaw said about the "divine" Sarah in 1895: ". . . her acting which is not the art of making you think more highly or feel more deeply, but the art of making you admire her, pity her, champion her, weep with her, laugh at her jokes, follow her fortunes breathlessly, and applaud her wildly when the curtain falls. And it is always Sarah Bernhardt in her own capacity who does this to you . . . the woman is always the same. She does not enter the leading character, she substitutes herself for it."

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Star of Paris

MADAME SARAH. By Cornelia Otis Skinner. Houghton Mifflin Co. 346 pp. \$6.95.

HAROLD CLURMAN

Sarah Bernhardt (born 1844 in Paris, where she died in 1923) played 183 parts during a career which began in 1862. She played Marguerite Gautier in *The Lady of the Camelias* more than 3,000 times. She performed in Paris, London, New York, Albany, Denver, Texas, San Francisco, Mobile, Amsterdam, Zurich, St. Petersburg, Warsaw, Moscow, Bologna, Florence, Rio de Janeiro, Athens, Constantinople, etc., etc.

She was a sensational success everywhere. Her name became a byword. By the nature of the medium it is a simple matter for a film star to achieve universal renown. Bernhardt attained greater fame and notoriety than any other actor in history—with the possible exception of Chaplin—by personal appearances. Among her friends and admirers were Victor Hugo, Emile Zola, Alexandre Dumas *fils*, Gambetta, Flaubert, Pasteur, Renan, Gounod, D'Annunzio and Oscar Wilde, "to men-

In 1879, after pointing out the excellent reasons for her prodigious vogue, Henry James added: "She has to a supreme degree . . . the advertising genius; she may, indeed, be called the muse of the newspaper. . . . I strongly suspect that she will find a triumphant career in the Western World. She is too American not to succeed in America. The people who have brought to the highest development the arts and graces of publicity will recognize a kindred spirit in a figure so admirably adapted for conspicuity."

Miss Skinner recognizes the trickery and vulgarity of some of Madame Sarah's effects. She has surely read the critics I have just cited; she quotes a complimentary passage from the Shaw review cited above, a review which is on the whole rather devastating. But she is not really interested in weighing the merits and debits of her heroine's art. She does not love Madame Sarah for herself alone (though no doubt the woman's energy, courage, impetuosity and theatrical effulgence deserve her adulation); she loves Sarah as the archetype of *la belle époque*, that glorious time which the French lived from the mid-19th century through the early years of the 20th.

Historians can detail and diagnose the sores and wounds, the poverty, corruption, follies, diseases, wars, rebellions and sieges, but the fact remains that France danced in those days to tunes, verses, words, arts of fabulous resilience, verve and excitement of the mind and the senses.

Miss Skinner's book, which possesses

the twinkling, old-fashioned, discreetly naughty humor of an essentially genteel lady, is a record of fond nostalgia. She who in one paragraph describes "the dear, the wonderful, the glorious comedian Constant Coquelin," and adds that he was "a modest, adorable person," enjoys everything that has to do with the customs, habits, even the vices of the period. Miss Skinner tells us that Bernhardt told countless lies, both in writing and in personal interviews, but she gushes over this too. It is all part of the glamour, the glitter, the bravado. Sarah made lovers of all her leading men and most of her authors: in this too Miss Skinner rejoices, not because she is a lusty lady but because Sarah and France were. They *swung*.

In her imagination Miss Skinner sits in the dressing rooms, in the wings of the auditoriums, goes to all the parties and outings where great artists and mountebanks, seers and courtesans, duelists and drug addicts, radicals and reactionaries commingle, and she can't get over the rapture of it all. Her book is therefore bound to be a bestseller. For we have mechanized everything including our passions and pleasures so that very little of either remains. In the age of conformity we must idealize a time when signal achievements and lurid sins were hardly distinguishable from each other because both were part of the ebullient experience of life. So now we have folk like Cornelia Otis Skinner on the one hand and hipsters on the other, each in their own way seeking release from the dull savagery of our Great Society.

ARCHITECTURE / ERVIN GALANTAY

The architects of Lincoln Center have thoughtfully provided two different approaches to the Metropolitan Opera. The first, serving the lucky few who arrive by taxicab, passes the fountain in the focus of the three major buildings which squat like constipated frogs around a water lily. This approach is quite satisfactory except in rain, snow or slush, conditions which often perversely coincide with the coveted performances.

But even in balmy weather the bulk of the audience arrives in the underground parking garage and alights from cars and limousines to an overture of engine noise. Then—satin shoes tip-toeing on oil-smeared concrete, delicate noses dipped in fur stoles to fend off the poisonous exhaust—the procession files toward the escalators and the de-

partmentalized consumption of Performing Arts. Searching for the right door in the tiled tunnels scented with disinfectant, I often recall with considerable feeling the memory of arriving at Venice's La Fenice by silent gondola, with torches lighting the canal.

Of course, access to the old Met was never quite that pleasant, but the design of the new house might at least have emulated the dignified carriage entrances of the Paris Opera which connect directly with ornate and spacious lobbies. As it is, one pushes through a last glass door to enter a space low-ceilinged and mean of proportions, but lavish in its exotic finishes. Moving up to the lounge one follows the spatial contortions of the grand staircase—interesting in itself but an element borrowed



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DR. CANTRIL has been psychological advisor to all but one of the last five administrations. During World War II, he was an expert consultant to the Secretary of War and of the Office of War Information.

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from Eero Saarinen's TWA-Kennedy Airport idiom and totally unrelated to the Harrison firm's own design vocabulary. As though to underline this discord, the heavy concrete edge of the stairs abruptly stops behind a column and a slim wooden handrail takes over. Such discontinuities abound: marble shafts of uncertain purpose rise with polished vigor to be chopped off short of the concrete vaults of the ceiling.

Writing in *The Nation* two years ago, Walter McQuade expressed the hope that Philharmonic Hall would remain Lincoln Center's architectural nadir. With respect to the new Met he must have assumed that the design of a traditional horseshoe auditorium with a red-and-gold color scheme is a foolproof proposition. But is it? Entering the grand space one is overwhelmed by the most astonishing potpourri of decorative devices, to wit: the proscenium frame is cut into folded surfaces covered with gilded warts and other excrescences; the boxes are shaped as doubly curved surfaces, some striped, some adorned with crystals; and, most striking, the design of the ceiling is an orgy of two-dimensional ovulation. "Stalinist decorative" is not my favorite style, but by comparison the designers of the Moscow Metro showed greater artistic "finesse" in the development of a coherent decorative theme. During a performance of *Il Trovatore*, beautifully designed and costumed by Motley, I could not help thinking that the interiors would have been infinitely better executed by a gifted stage designer.

It is hard to swallow the proffered excuse that the awkward decoration of the Met "designed itself" as the dependent variable of the acoustic re-

quirements. The acoustics are indeed good, and the credit is primarily due to Cyril Harris, the acoustical consultant. Harris likes to point out that music capriciously calls for varied, broken surfaces, once admirably provided by the cheeks and buttocks of baroque *putti*, by stucco ceilings and chandeliers. The search for adequate ersatz patterns is what overtakes the formal inventiveness of modern architects. The design of ceilings is especially trying: Abramovitz's shields at the Philharmonic are as embarrassing as Johnson's intersecting curlicues radiating from an oversize crystal ball at the State Theater. Yet Johnson at least deployed a fairly well coordinated set of decorative elements, while at the Met textures and material crowd one another in hapless juxtaposition.

Above the center of the Met's proscenium (where in royal theatres the ruler's coat of arms is displayed) there curls an enigmatic bundle of perforated strips and gilded noodles. Apart from this sculptural emblem, there is no work of art in the auditorium. In baroque theatres the ceiling was often the primary object of artistic attention, and in view of the awkward alternative provided in the new opera, it is a pity that its ceiling was not painted. Perhaps the directors of the project hesitated to copy the Paris Opera where Chagall repainted the flat cupola beautifully, although somewhat out of tune with the color key of Garnier's mellow decoration. Instead of a ceiling, the Met presented Chagall with two blank surfaces in the lounge for which the aging master produced two enormous canvases. Inside the building, these paintings can be viewed only from a skewed angle, which makes me suspect that the paintings were not conceived as part of the original design. Chagall's two "lyric fantasies" can be better seen from the plaza where they beckon from behind the large glass walls. Their light, dreamlike quality might have softened the maladroit design of the lounge, were it not for heavy box frames and huge draperies that entirely divorce the paintings from the architecture. They are degraded to "lobby art," a genre much in favor with New York's commercial architecture. I once heard a local realtor advising his design team to cut the expense of architecture and compensate for adequate space by "jazzing up" the lobby: "throw in a couple of colors, buy some plants and some art," he said.

This "art appliqué," art applied to architecture as a sop and an afterthought, is characteristic of much that

can be seen at Lincoln Center. To be sure, some of the art work has been donated, was gratefully received and now demands prominent display. But even the commissioned pieces do little to upgrade the architecture. There are exceptions: the big Moore in front of the Beaumont Theater completes the space with its black pool. The State Theater's pair of Nadelmans—gaped at from the lacy galleries as though they were white belugas in an aquarium—are at least partly convincing. One senses that the space was conceived to contain two contrapuntal heroic sculptures, and their presence is essential for spatial balance. This cannot be said of Lip-pold's tangled metal strips in Philharmonic Hall; the artist obviously could not "swing" with Abramovitz's architecture as well as he did with Johnson's Four Seasons Restaurant, one of the few spaces in New York where a comfortable relation is established between art work and architecture.

Despite all the talk about the essential unity of architecture and the "sister arts," our time has created a wider gap between architects and artists than ever existed before. Under the Gothic or the Baroque, art and architecture formed an inseparable entity; even the 19th century produced a synthesis of architecture and decoration, a comprehensive modulation from vast volume to graspable small scale. Since then, Soviet "social realism" has discredited any view of art as servant of a stated social philosophy and strengthened the narcissistic individualism of Western artists. The modern painter or sculptor, in his self-appointed role as a sort of "early-warning system" of McLuhanian pretension, no longer cares to consort with architects.

Edgar Kaufman, Jr., a leading theoretician of architecture, feels that the take-it-or-leave-it pose of modern artists is justifiable, since the essence of modern art is a search for unlimited freedom of expression which would be negated by collaboration. John Gordon, a curator of the Whitney, confirms that this indifference is real. The best artists are reluctant to become involved with "lobby art," the lesser ones accept commissions with a cynically commercial shrug. Of the three museums recently built in New York for modern art, none provides any fixed place for a major art work: the buildings are mainly store-houses for art objects. Neither curators nor architects seem sufficiently assured of their judgment to select art for permanent placement. This is a pity, because abstract art can assume increased meaning when integrated with architecture, and the discipline imposed by

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
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		Sidney Peck
		Cleveland Robinson
		Dagmar Wilson
	National Director:	
	James Bevel	
	West Coast Director:	
	Kipp Dawson	

SATURDAY, APRIL 15, 1967 NEW YORK SAN FRANCISCO

We Address a Call for Action to All Americans Whose Lives Are Twisted by This War:

- To the mothers and fathers whose sons are taken;
- To the GIs who face death;
- To the youth, filled with the love of life, drafted to take the lives of others;
- To the black people and other minorities, who are tired of fighting for a "democracy" they have never enjoyed;
- To labor, facing higher taxes and prices while war profits soar and pressures are applied against wage increases and the right to strike;
- To the farmers caught in the "cost-price" squeeze and being taxed off their land;
- To professionals, businessmen and others who are disturbed about the war and are anxious to see it end;
- To the clergy who call all men to be brothers and who are mocked by this slaughter.

Please Clip and Mail to:

National Office:	West Coast Office:
Spring Mobilization	Spring Mobilization
Committee	Committee
857 Broadway	55 Colton Street
New York N.Y. 10003	San Francisco, Calif. 94103
Phone: (212) 675-4606	Phone: (415) 431-4584

☐ I will attend the mobilization April 15 in N. Y.
In San Francisco

☐ I will help mobilize against the war in my local area.

☐ I enclose a contribution of \$..... to help pay
the cost of the national mobilization.

Name Phone

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City State Zip

the architectural context need not cripple artistic self-expression. Although successful collaboration between artists and architects is not frequent in this city, there are many good examples abroad. In the new municipal theatre of the small German town of Ingolstadt, forthright modern architecture integrates the work of congenial artists: reliefs cast in the very structural walls, gold-leaf paintings applied directly to the concrete surface. In Takamatsu, Japan, the abstract murals of Genichiro Inokuma, an artist who lives in New York, are imbedded in the concrete of architect Tange's city hall to form a spatial entity in perfect spiritual consonance. Other examples are architect Villanueva's Central University in Caracas, Venezuela, or the buildings of the new University of St. Gall,

Switzerland, by Forderer. In both cases artists were consulted during the formative stage of architectural design and a give-and-take developed between the architects and the artists—among them, Léger, Arp, Pevsner, Laurens, Vasarely, Miró and Penalba.

Lincoln Center, alas, does not deliver what it promised with so much fanfare: an "orchestra" of the visual arts to serve as an inspiration to the performing artists; a "bold . . . statement to the enduring values of art as a true measure of civilization. . . ." Corbusier once said: "In architectural space a piece of art is either priceless or worthless." In this spatial sense, there is little "priceless" art at Lincoln Center—perhaps because there is so little architecture of sufficient "worth" to call for it.

tory could have revealed how they worked the miracle—in spite of superiors, company, industry and advertisers.

I place such emphasis on the book Friendly might have written because the one he did write, *Due To Circumstances Beyond Our Control* (Random House), is nothing like what his experience might suggest. In this guarded, no-name-or-blame backward glance at commercial television, Friendly spends half his space on scanty documentation—as deep as a press release—of his two major documentary series, *See It Now* and *C.B.S. Reports*.

A third is devoted to Friendly's short, happy life as president of C.B.S. News, two years that came to an end with his resignation last year over the C.B.S. decision not to carry George Kennan's testimony on Vietnam before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings. Revenue-producing entertainment reruns were telecast instead.

The rest of the book is evangelism, part persuasive (the chapter, "Common Stock vs. the Commonweal," contrasting huge private profits with minuscule public service), and part rehash (last summer's Ford Foundation plan to use a domestic satellite as a means whereby the commercial networks would finance a noncommercial rival).

In Friendly's canon, the system is to be blamed, not the individuals who created and manage the system. Hence the title. His book is readable; it seems dictated. It is also shallow and full of appalling sycophancies and galling evasions.

"We could feel CBS's support for 'See It Now' fading ever so gradually." Eh? When and how was the decision made to combat McCarthyism? Why was Teddy White, as a China expert, "not deemed acceptable to the management"? Was that a news or business judgment? "I suppose I was subtly influenced to do controversial subjects in a noncontroversial manner." How?

Friendly says "no opprobrium is intended for anyone other than Senator McCarthy—certainly not for William Paley or Frank Stanton." But stiletto work is apparent. Stanton is described as more interested in form than content and given to wasting time on such trivialities as the marking of the men's rooms (M) in the new C.B.S. building.

Paley is quoted about *See It Now*: "I don't want this constant stomach ache every time you do a controversial subject." Even more shattering is his reported statement in a divisional-president meeting that unscheduled news coverage of events such as Sir Winston Churchill's funeral, the space program and civil rights affected "first-quarter

TELEVISION / John Horn

Mr. Horn covers television daily for the Publishers Newspaper Syndicate, and theatre and popular entertainment for the weekly Rockland Independent. He has been television critic-reporter for the New York Herald Tribune, Variety and the New York Star, and a field producer on Edward R. Murrow's Person to Person.

If Fred W. Friendly had written a candid account, a true history, of his sixteen-year tenure at C.B.S., what a book it could have been!

It would have contained a real appreciation of the late Edward R. Murrow, with whom Friendly spent most of his C.B.S. time in harness, and to whom he still owes a considerable debt. Perhaps not the Murrow of before and during World War II, Murrow at his best, alerting America to Nazism (without granting equal time) from amid the bomb fires of London, when as one of radio's news pioneers he set broadcast journalism's standards for integrity, courage, responsibility and crisp reporting. But possibly Murrow the man, the quixotic mixture of poet and peasant, of thinker and doer, the shy man in the public eye.

The book that Friendly did not write might also have followed the growth of C.B.S. News—fountainhead of news broadcasting—from a handful of friends to a corporate division, and recorded the transition from radio to television, a far more cumbersome method of communication.

It would have charted the radical change of television from a journalistic tool of incalculable service and influ-

ence to a money-making machine of fantasy entertainment and advertising. In this context, Friendly might have described the guerrilla war he was forced to wage in order to survive, let alone function. It has been a war of newsmen against their own network's commercial system, a steam roller of paid-for time aboard which the news must pay or beg its way. And on a related front it has been a war against the subtle or overt pressures of those non-journalists, in or out of a network, who attempt to keep news and documentaries as happy, conformist and noncontroversial as the rest of television.

Against such a background, the great programs that Murrow and Friendly produced would stand out as heroic. They shook up America: not just the entrenched interests, who screamed and threatened but average citizens who hardly expected their cause, which is to say their sense of themselves as individuals and not as an exploitable market, to be championed on the electronic box. To question, to arouse, to stimulate are television's great possibilities. Murrow and Friendly made them actualities—for a time.

Their wars against McCarthyism, their crusades in behalf of the dispossessed and disadvantaged (migrant workers and the American Negro, among others), their defiance of the money establishment (the automotive and tobacco industries, the political wing of the American Medical Association) are proof they were on the side of the citizen; events have proved that they were on the side of history. An inside his-

programming costs [so as to reduce earnings] by six cents a share." A few gossip tidbits like that will cause near apoplexy in the C.B.S. hierarchy and may be titillation enough for best-sellerdom.

Friendly does mention two big stories he missed producing as documentaries—black listing and the quiz scandals. But he does not say whether he would have been permitted to indulge in such industry self-criticism. He reveals in passing that he accepted black listing when he was producer of the news quiz show, *Who Said That?*, and that on another occasion he stood by while an unnamed executive cleared a theme-music composer.

The book—cautious, evasive—is not typical of the blunt rampager. Friendly would have made a better documentary of the material. He is a doer, not a sayer; a catalyzer of ideas. His programs prove it. His "public dividend" plan for a noncommercial network and his flair for publicity promise to broaden the review of educational television, on this year's Congressional agenda, into a full-scale re-evaluation of all American television. A firm believer in "what the American people don't know can kill them" (his wife's words), he may yet get others to act in the domain of U.S. television. But by failing to practice in his book what he preaches in his crusades, he has seriously damaged his cause.

ART

MAX KOZLOFF

For all its apparent obviousness, the box or cube is a polyvalent form in modern sculpture. The very fact that one can refer to it, on the one hand, as a rectangular receptacle and, on the other, as a geometrical element, indicates some of the virtuosity of meaning that has made it as durable as the square in painting. The cube can be hollow, a mere format containing extremely variegated sculptural objects or artifacts; it can also be incorporated into a larger three-dimensional vocabulary in which, in part or whole, fully stated or suggested, it is a constituent. Naturally, these differing functions will have much to do with the way the spectator perceives scale, reading into the work either a microcosmic or a macrocosmic situation, depending upon the fairly direct alternatives that are offered him. Concomitantly, they will inflect space very characteristically, whether by establishing a module with perpendicular relationships of surface, or by opening up

100 Years of Fighting Stampedes*

THE NATION has managed to survive, the Decatur (Illinois) *Herald* observed on the occasion of our centennial, "by fighting stampedes for over 100 years."

Heading off stampedes is peculiarly American; the country has the energy and space to set hoofs really thundering. We call to mind only a few of the most irrational flights: the jingoism that plunged us into wars with Mexico and Spain, the hypocritical hysteria of Prohibition, the "uproar" of McCarthyism, "Let's Get Hoffa!," "Send in the Marines!" (to Haiti, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, etc.), "we must beat the Russians to the moon," the anti-missile missile, the SST. The list is long. Some of the stampedes of the last 102 years ran over us roughshod, some we slowed a bit, some we helped to stop. But there are few we failed to challenge. If you think *Bonanza* is where the action is, come out on the range with *The Nation*.

*("Stampede, any headlong flight of a large group; from the Mex.-Sp. *estampida* or 'uproar.'")

"The South's hope, Dennett reported, was that the former slaveholders would 'get the States back into their hands,' for they 'much preferred that the freedmen be kept in a condition as nearly as possible resembling their former slavery.'"

"Dennett's dispatches are examples of masterly journalism. Dennett died in 1874—before the slaveholders got back the states, overthrew the Reconstruction, and reduced the freedmen to a condition resembling slavery."

N. Y. Times 10/31/65

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a relatively small cavity, into which one peers and juxtaposes the frame as the stage can be juxtaposed with its props and actors. Louise Nevelson, now being presented in an illuminating retrospective at the Whitney, follows the latter course.

Well known since the mid-fifties, Nevelson's work has been, at times literally, a fixture of the artistic scene. Her frequently giant, black wooden walls of gridded boxes, that resemble break-fronts or highboys, have a habit of taking over entire segments of an environment, as if demanding equality with furniture on its own terms—or better still, supplanting it. Though Nevelson's pieces are shallow enough (generally being not more than a foot deep), they are nevertheless oddly commanding. This is due in part to their blackness which, because it puts you in doubt about the exact location of the planes, tends to obscure the internal sculptural boundaries of the work. Then, too, her sculpture is a seemingly endless aggregate of boxes, so that while the compositional unit is small, it proliferates in a spirit that is almost grandiose. Like a reredos, a Nevelson sculpture suffuses the space with a reverential monumentality. It is a ritualized theatre whose multiple episodes are distributed laterally across the whole possible span of the eye, diffusing the attention by its limitless variety, and yet as impressive as a monolith in its final proportions. It therefore transcends the lapidary and miniaturized reading, the sequential, compartmental ordering of forms (or more often, a literary gaming with forms) that assemblage imposes upon the spectator.

This is not to say that one can ignore Miss Nevelson's iconography. These perverse bookcases are densely crowded with objects that half resemble the "metaphysical" wands of di Chirico and Carra, mingled with the fluted balustrades and the filigree sprockets of American gingerbread homesteads. Bowling pins and table legs alternate with more abstract flanges, spandrels and crating. If the whole field is a species of screen, it is in turn broken up into innumerable smaller screens, like incomplete and curving stage flats.

It has already been noted that Nevelson derives in about equal measure from Cubism and Surrealism. The grid-like faceted format, with its flat planes and convex volumes, and its sense of shifting apertures, contrasts with insistently dislocated and fragmented found objects, that have almost the status of personages in their own right. Yet the effect of fetishistic encrusta-

tion (or rather display) is countered by the deliberate schematism of the material, and the formalized nonspecified distancing of the imagery. She is interested neither in nostalgic decay nor technological glamour. Her titles, on the contrary, indicate a concern for atmospheric states, ceremonial events, exotic places. Such is the gist of legends like "Young Shadows," "Black Moon," "Tropical Garden," etc. There is even to be found in this show a gilded, slatted "altarpiece" such as "An American Tribute to the British People," or a piece called "Homage to 6,000,000."

It must be admitted that these are somewhat arbitrary labels; there is nothing inevitable about their relationship to the objects they caption—although there is also no reason why there has to be. But in the installation of certain of her works, Nevelson has seen to it that only an extremely dim or bluish light bathes the wooden façade with a hushed lunar glow that presumes to evoke the unearthliness hinted at by her titles. She will sacrifice a considerable degree of physical articulation in order to intensify this mood, to enshrine her special odds and ends as unintentionally campy objects of veneration. No doubt a great deal of intelligence is needed to integrate Nevelson's sculptures effectively into their surroundings, and the Whitney probably does an adequate job, considering that it is not an apartment. But the special circumstances demanded by the lighting introduce an illustrational, rather than obey an expository function. They also betray a weakness in the overall vision.

I would say that this weakness is compounded of facility and a kind of willful humanism. They lead to an accent on style which ultimately does not convince, either as a crystallization of emotion, or as formal inventiveness. A tremendously energetic resourcefulness of execution does not quite cover up a conceptual stasis, with the result that the sculpture falls back on mannerism, a fault unfortunately common in American sculpture that matured in the 1950s. (Nevelson herself is slightly older than the Abstract Expressionists.) Hers, however, is a mannerism of format and motif, rather than of surface. She will not go so far into the realm of personal poetry as Cornell, though she more than works at it; she will also typically steer clear of the chaotic, the expressionist or the ironic, as in Rauschenberg's combine paintings. The more hieratic and Olympian offerings at the Whitney belong to an area far removed, but somewhere between these two alternatives. The difficulty is that Nevelson's im-

personality is studied, but not rigorously abstract: the interplay of forms in her countless tableaux is reiterated more in the cause of "interest" than necessity. Possibly that is why it seems a chore to "work" with her compositions; while, on the other hand, it is too easy to appreciate their effect. This predicament is the more regrettable because the sculptor is not merely dedicated and ambitious but substantially talented.

It is to the credit of the Whitney to have allowed us to trace this talent in a development that had not previously been clear, at least to me. Louise Nevelson first seems to have emerged as a sculptor of potentiality in 1955, with some Picasso-Surrealist pieces, silhouettes impaled with wooden pegs and spikes ("Indian Chief"), that still seem fresh. Of the next year, "Undermarine Scape," a glass box with bent wooden "weeds" interspersed with "bone" forms, is an extremely appealing creation. She hits her stride in the next three years, with the box façades, which are stronger whenever—although this is comparatively rare—they are simpler. From a historical point of view, however, in their extendability, and their literal piled-up additiveness of construction (without pedestal), they were characterful contributions to the tradition of assemblage. Examples of their kind painted in white or gold, on the contrary, look only too much like repainted compilations from the curio and antique shops of the New York East Side. From the works that approach 1964, I prefer the "bas-reliefs" to the totems, the evenly graded figurations to the looser, more broken up assemblies, where the attempt to bring off a tour de force is purchased only by a rather conventional grouping of forces. On the other hand, the open door or zigzag or curving aggregations ("Homage to the World") are fruitful changeovers, and often genuinely imposing. Lately, Nevelson has constructed a number of aluminum and black epoxy enameled staggered fronts composed of open-faced room dividers, that are more brittle and less associative than is her usual work. An interest in modules and riveted jointures comes undistractedly to the fore. Here she is dependent much more emphatically on her capacities as an organizer, and here she is attaining her most coherent, if also most restricted, results. Finally, a very recent clear plastic, "Model for Atmosphere and Environment, Ice Palace I," with its glittering rivets punctuating a three-dimensional chessboard, achieves a charming poetry, and terminates the exhibition on an optimistic note.